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INTRODUCTION
On the first day of the Supreme Court’s 2017 term, the Court
heard argument in a case that affected the rights of some 60 million American workers.1 At issue in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
was the lawfulness of an individual employment agreement that
required all employment-related disputes to be resolved in oneon-one arbitration and foreclosed access to any form of collective
dispute resolution.2 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides
that covered arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and

1. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.
Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“[A]pproximately 55 percent of non-union private
employees have contracts that are covered by mandatory arbitration agreements, and that covers about 60 million people.”).
2. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1619–21.
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enforceable”3 and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
requiring arbitration agreements to be enforced “according to
their terms.”4 But the Norris-LaGuardia Act and National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) guarantee workers’ right to engage in
“concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.”5 And the NLRA has long been
interpreted by courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to protect workers’ right to seek legal remedies as a
group6 and to prohibit employers from demanding that employees waive the NLRA’s protections in individual employment
agreements.7 Under the FAA, the agreement in Epic Systems
3. U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub L. No. 68-401, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Arbitration
Act, FAA, or Act).
4. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1612; see, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship
v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (“By its terms . . . the Act cares not only
about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration agreements, but also about their initial
‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into them.”); Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)
(“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural
rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their
terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”).
5. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection. . .”); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102
(2012) (recognizing the public policy of the United States that the individual
worker “be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor . . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
6. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978) (dictum) (“[I]t
has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects employees from
retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions
through resort to administrative and judicial forums, and that employees’ appeals to legislators to protect their interests as employees are within the scope
of this clause.”); see, e.g., Harco Trucking, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 478, 478–79 (2005)
(filing a wage and hour class action on behalf of similarly situated employees);
Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948–49 (1942) (filing of consolidated Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims concerted activity); Poultrymen’s Serv. Corp., 41 N.L.R.B. 444, 460–61, n.28 (1942) (filing of FLSA suit on
behalf of employee and others similarly situated), enforced, 138 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1943).
7. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (“Wherever
private contracts conflict with [the NLRB’s] functions, they obviously must yield
or the [NLRA] would be reduced to a futility.”); Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309
U.S. 350, 361 (1940) (finding contracts founded on “the fruits of unfair labor
practices, stipulated for the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed
by the [NLRA] . . . were appropriate subjects for [ ] affirmative remedial action”).
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seemed to be enforceable.8 The NLRB, however, deemed the
agreement unlawful under Norris-LaGuardia and the NLRA.9
Three courts of appeals concurred in its reasoning.10
Seven months after oral argument, a sharply divided Court
ruled that Epic System’s agreement should be enforced.11 In his
first major opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch
concluded that the “emphatic” language of the FAA “clearly” required that the agreement be enforced according to its terms12
and that the NLRA’s right to concerted activity did not modify
the FAA’s commands.13 Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that the agreement’s waiver of the right to engage
in collective dispute resolution was the exact type of employeedisempowering “agreement” that Norris-LaGuardia and the
NLRA aimed to prevent.14 Pointing out that the Court’s decision
would undermine enforcement of federal wage and hour law,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[c]ongressional correction of the
Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’ rights to act in concert
is urgently in order.”15 Justice Gorsuch conceded that the legal
status of collective action waivers was contested and invited
Congress to revisit the issue.16 But he maintained that, under
the law as it stood, the agreement’s lawfulness was “clear.”17
The debate in Epic Systems highlights a problem of statutory interpretation with important consequences for access to
civil justice and the powers of federal administrative agencies.18
8. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1616 (“[T]he Federal Arbitration Act generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written.”).
9. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292–93 (2012) (denying enforcement).
10. See NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 2017); Morris
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 894 F. 3d
1093 (9th Cir. 2018); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir.
2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
11. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
12. Id. at 1621–22.
13. Id. at 1624.
14. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 1633 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 1632 (“Congress is of course always free to amend this judgment.”).
17. Id. at 1619. Justice Gorsuch apparently did not recognize the irony of
labelling the answer to a question that had divided the courts of appeals, the
NLRB, and two solicitor general’s offices “clear.”
18. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363,
368–69 (2018) (describing legal disputes over the “flurry of [agency] regulation”
restricting the use of arbitration as “the next battleground in the ‘arbitration
war’”); cf. Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal
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Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the scope of arbitration under the FAA, discarding readings of the statute that for most of the twentieth century limited
arbitration’s impact on federal regulatory programs.19 As the
scope of arbitration expanded, regulated parties increasingly
used it in ways that conflicted with statutes such as the NLRA.20
Agencies such as the NLRB responded by drawing on statutes
they administered to limit or prohibit the use of arbitration.21
Those statutes often contain broad delegations of regulatory authority.22 For example, the NLRA gives the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate federal unfair-labor practice claims, and
courts have extended Chevron deference to the Board’s interpretation of the Act.23 But the statutes do not explicitly address
agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration.24 Seizing on this ambiguity, businesses challenged agency regulations on the ground
that they violated the FAA.25
The validity of the challenged agency regulations depends
in the first instance on how the FAA relates to other federal laws.
But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is strangely inconclusive
on that subject. The Court has said that Section 2 of the FAA
expresses a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”26 and that a party opposing arbitration of a claim covered by an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing why

Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 65 (2013) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation
of the FAA “poses a risk to deny access to, and the operation of, administrative
agency procedures specifically established to handle certain claims”).
19. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”);
see, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123
(1987) (reviewing the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA using the Chevron
framework); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d
1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Chevron affords the NLRB broad
interpretive discretion).
24. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
25. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
26. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
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the claim is not arbitrable.27 The Court has also ruled that statutory claims are presumptively arbitrable,28 and it has rejected
arguments that Congress necessarily intended claims under various regulatory statutes to be asserted in court rather than arbitration.29 But the Supreme Court has not set out a framework
that explains how the FAA relates to other laws and the circumstances in which another federal statute qualifies the FAA’s
rules of dispute resolution procedure—most prominently, the
principle that courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate “according to their terms.”30
This Article develops a theory that answers those questions.31 Because this Article aims to contribute to ongoing de-

27. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987);
see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018) (noting that the
Court had rejected attempts to “conjure” conflicts between the FAA and other
statutory regimes).
28. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
29. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 96, 117 (2012)
(holding that claims under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1679 (2012), are arbitrable); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (holding claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012), are arbitrable);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1989)
(holding that claims can be arbitrated under the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
30. See CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98; cf. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (holding the FAA
preempts inconsistent state laws).
31. This Article’s theory of the FAA’s place in federal law builds on two related literatures. The first considers agency arbitration regulation from normative and institutional perspectives and evaluates the costs and benefits of arbitration and agency action regulating how it is used. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph
Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 275–76 (2013) (noting regulation by federal administrative
agencies as a possible regulatory response to the rise of mandatory arbitration
in consumer and employment contracts); Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 992 (2017) (examining “the roles that federal
administrative agencies have begun to play in response to the rise of private
arbitration” and “how agencies can partially address some of the concerns that
scholars of regulation and civil procedure have noted regarding the rise of arbitration”); David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 990–91
(2017) [hereinafter Noll, Regulating Arbitration] (examining the policy rationales for regulating arbitration through federal regulation and administrative
action and arguing that policymakers should focus on arbitration’s effects on
the implementation of statutory policy). The second literature considers the relationship between the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence and specific
regulatory regimes such as the NLRA. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Collective
Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration: Implications of D.R. Horton and
Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 179 (2014) (explaining “why
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bates over the limits of arbitration and the validity of agency arbitration regulations, it does not revisit the questions of statutory interpretation that have preoccupied federal arbitration jurisprudence for the past three decades—whether the FAA
permits arbitration of federal statutory claims, the circumstances in which the FAA preempts state regulation, and the extent of contracting parties’ control over the procedures used in
arbitration.32 Instead, this Article develops a general theory of
the FAA’s place in federal law. What type of statute is the FAA?
When are the Act’s commands affected by another federal law?
And what must another statute say to modify the FAA?33
That theory of the FAA proceeds from two basic propositions: (1) the FAA establishes default rules governing the status
and enforceability of arbitration agreements; and (2) whether
another law modifies the FAA’s background commands presents
an ordinary question of statutory interpretation. The FAA is not,

collective action waivers or requirements to arbitrate individually are unenforceable under the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act”); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2015) (suggesting that the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Division should address arbitration’s anti-competitive effects by conditioning merger approval on
firms not imposing mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts); Daniel G.
Lloyd, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration Act: The
Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (arguing
that the Federal Trade Commission has authority to regulate the use of arbitration under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1032 (2013) (defending the National
Labor Relations Board’s conclusion that an employment agreement that waives
the employee’s right to engage in collective dispute resolution violates the
NLRA); Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determination of Substantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907, 907–09 (2015)
(examining the conflict between the FAA and the right to engage in concerted
activity under the NLRA and arguing that the NLRB’s interpretation of the Act
qualifies for judicial deference). Neither of these literatures offers a general theory of the FAA’s place in federal law or the circumstances in which other statutes modify the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution procedure. In addition, most
scholars that have considered the question conclude that a statute which allows
an agency to speak with the force of law under Chevron authorizes the agency
to regulate the use of arbitration. As shown below, that argument misapplies
Chevron. See infra notes 339–52 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 148–55 (1992).
33. In considering these questions, this Article relies on the text, historical
context, and textually discernable purposes of the FAA and other federal statutes. None of this Article’s claims depend on drawing an equivalence between
statutory meaning and intentions revealed in forms of legislative history such
as committee hearings or floor statements.
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on any accepted theory of statutory interpretation, a “super-statute” that occupies a special position in federal law.34
Enacted in 1925 “to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration,”35 the FAA does not take precedence over other laws in the
same manner as cross-cutting statutes such as the Endangered
Species Act or Religious Freedom Restoration Act.36 Instead, the
FAA functions like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
establishes procedural defaults that apply unless and until another statute modifies its commands.37 As is widely recognized,
statutes that expressly address the validity, enforceability, or
revocability of agreements to arbitrate qualify the FAA. But under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, a range of
laws also impliedly qualify the FAA.38 Among them are federal
statutes governing primary conduct, statutes that prescribe specific procedures and remedies for statutory claims, statutes that
charge an agency with overseeing regulated parties’ contracting,
and statutes that direct an agency to promulgate a subsidiary
statutory policy that is negatively affected by the use of arbitration.39
These statutes provide authority for a number of contested
agency arbitration regulations, among them the 2016 Long Term
Care Rule promulgated by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS),40 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2017 Arbitration Rule (which has been repealed by Congress),41 and the 2016 Borrower Defense rule promulgated by the
Department of Education (DOE).42 But there is an important
category of statutes that do not qualify the FAA, and therefore
do not provide authority for agency arbitration regulation. These
are the type of statutes at issue in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

34. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16–17 (2010) (describing
the developmental process that results in a statute acquiring “super” status).
35. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
36. See infra text accompanying note 149.
37. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part III.B.
39. See id.
40. See Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed.
Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016).
41. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017), repealed by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017).
42. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov.
1, 2016) (final rule).
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.43 Chevron teaches that an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute that it is charged
with administering is authoritative.44 But Chevron addresses a
different set of “statutory circumstances” than those relevant to
agency arbitration regulation, one in which Congress has
charged a single agency with administering a single law.45 In
contrast to the scenario Chevron addresses, agency arbitration
regulation implicates at least two statutes. And one of those statutes, the FAA, detracts from rather than supports the agency’s
regulatory authority. This difference makes Chevron basically
irrelevant to agencies’ statutory authority to regulate the use of
arbitration.
This Article’s theory of the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws shows that many of the Trump administration’s efforts
to rollback Obama-era arbitration rules are based on a legally
erroneous premise insofar as they assume that the regulating
agency lacks statutory authority to regulate arbitration. More
broadly, this Article demonstrates that the FAA is less exceptional than critics and supporters of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence both tend to assume. In reality, the FAA is
qualified by a range of laws that directly constrain parties’ freedom to arbitrate on terms of their own choosing or authorize an
agency to regulate the use of arbitration in particular domains.
Understanding this provides fresh context for current and future
conflicts over agency arbitration regulation.
Part I of this Article explains the origins of conflicts over
agency arbitration regulation and then explains why those conflicts turn on the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws. Part
II begins to work out a theory of the FAA’s place in federal law
by showing that the FAA functions as a statutory floor that establishes baseline rules of procedure. Despite the Supreme
Court’s expansive interpretations of the Act, Part II shows that
the FAA does not enjoy any special place in federal law; it is a
statute like any other. Part III turns to the FAA’s relationship

43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see infra note 349 and accompanying text (collecting scholarship that contends agencies may regulate arbitration under statutes
that support Chevron deference).
44. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40.
45. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (explaining
that in this scenario “[i]t can be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in
the statute or fill[ing] in a space in the enacted law”).
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to other federal laws. Applying ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, this Part demonstrates that the FAA’s background
rules of dispute resolution procedure are modified by a range of
statutes that modify the FAA expressly and impliedly. Those
statutes supply statutory authority for many contested arbitration regulations. But as Part IV shows, the FAA is not modified
by Chevron-type statutes, rendering Chevron essentially irrelevant to agency arbitration regulation. Together, Parts II through
IV present a complete picture of the FAA’s place in federal law.
As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognizes, the FAA establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration.46 That policy,
however, is constrained in important respects by other federal
statutes and agency action taken under their authority.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM
Until recently, there were few situations where the use of
arbitration conflicted with federal regulatory statutes. This Part
explains why, after a long period of peace, conflicts between arbitration and regulatory statutes suddenly appeared in the past
decade. It then explains why those conflicts turn on the FAA’s
relationship to other federal laws.
A. THE RISE OF ARBITRATION CONFLICTS
1. The Arbitration Revolution
The story of the FAA’s origins, transformation, and expansion “has been told many times.”47 Enacted by the 68th Congress
in 1925, the FAA provides that a covered arbitration agreement
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”48 As is now familiar, the statute was the capstone of a
decade-long campaign led by the New York State Chamber of

46. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 1 (“[In the FAA there is] a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”).
47. Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 71 VAND. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3253407.
48. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub L. No. 68-401, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). The FAA covers any “maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” id. § 2, but the FAA does
not “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. § 1.
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Commerce and the American Bar Association to shore up the legal basis for commercial arbitration.49 Before the early twentieth
century arbitration reform movement, courts often refused to enforce arbitration agreements between commercial parties on the
ground that arbitration “ousted” courts from exercising jurisdiction conferred by law or because damages adequately compensated a party whose counter-party refused to honor an agreement to arbitrate.50 Courts also allowed parties to repudiate
(revoke) arbitration agreements at any point before an arbitration award was issued on the basis of similar concerns.51 State
legislation in New York and New Jersey overturned these doctrines, but did not apply in federal court under then-prevailing
conflicts of law principles.52 In providing that an arbitration

49. The FAA’s historical origins are now the subject of two monographs: (1)
MACNEIL, supra note 32; and (2) IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE:
THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013). See also AlliedBruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the statute’s legislative history); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal
Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1946–48 (2014)
(describing the FAA as part of a broader movement to simplify legal procedure
in the 1920s and 1930s); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94
TEX. L. REV. 265, 301–02 (2015) (tracing the legislative history of the FAA);
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. L. REV. 99,
101–03 (2006) (describing the 68th Congress’s goals in the FAA); Luke P. Norris,
The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 249, 252–53 (2018) (tracing the history
of FAA § 1 and concluding that § 1 excludes contracts characterized by “wide
economic disparities . . . between the parties” from arbitration); cf. Christopher
R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105–07 (2002) (seeking to
show that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the FAA is not ruled
out by the statute’s legislative history). See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940 (2015) (describing early twentieth century legal reform movements that influenced thinking about arbitration).
50. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–22 (1924)
(discussing the common law rules and analysis for arbitration disputes).
51. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S.
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 14 (1924) [hereinafter Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes]
(statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber
of Commerce) (“The difficulty is that men do enter into [arbitration] agreements
and then afterwards repudiate the agreement, and the difficulty has been that
for over 300 years . . . the courts have said that . . . an [arbitration] agreement
was one that was revocable at any time.”).
52. See, e.g., Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124 (“The [New York] Arbitration
Law deals merely with the remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations
voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty.”).
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agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,”53 the FAA expressly overrode the common law “revocability” and “unenforceability” doctrines, making arbitration agreements enforceable in
federal court.54
The FAA is a “barebones statute.”55 During congressional
hearings on the bill that became the FAA, Julius Cohen, the New
York lawyer considered the FAA’s architect, testified that federal and state regulatory agencies had broad authority to regulate the use of arbitration.56 But the FAA’s text does not address
the question one way or the other.57 Nor does the FAA address
the arbitrability of statutory rights, arbitrators’ duty to follow
statutory procedures and remedies, or the extent of parties’ authority over the procedures used in arbitration.58 Enacted thirteen years before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect,59 and before Congress passed the first statute
contemplating class action enforcement (the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938),60 the FAA says nothing about aggregate dispute resolution.61
The FAA’s effect on other federal laws depends largely on
how these interpretive questions are resolved. Although the text
of FAA Section 2 can be read literally as saying that any piece of
paper that is denominated an agreement to arbitrate must be
enforced, this literal reading would produce absurd results. No
53. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
54. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“In the
Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements . . . .”).
55. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, supra note 31, at 994.
56. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, supra note 51, at 15
(“[W]e have the regulation of the Federal Government, through its regularly
constituted bodies, and they protect everybody. Railroad contracts and express
contracts and insurance contracts are provided for. You can not get a provision
into an insurance contract to-day unless it is approved by the insurance department. In other words, people are protected to-day as never before.”). For more
on Cohen’s role in the FAA’s enactment, see, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 32, at
28; Hiro N. Aragaki, The Metaphysics of Arbitration: A Reply to Hensler and
Khatam, 18 NEV. L.J. 541, 557 (2018).
57. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2.
58. Id.
59. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909 (1987) (describing the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
60. The Federal Wages and Hours Act, 52 HARV. L. REV. 646, 669 (1939)
(describing the FLSA’s collective action provisions).
61. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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one thinks that an arbitrator could kill the losing party if the
agreement so provided. And for most of the twentieth century,
the statute was interpreted less expansively.62 Three specific assumptions limited the scope of arbitration under the FAA, and
with it, arbitration’s impact on other federal laws.
First, courts assumed that the FAA applied only in federal
courts and did not preempt state laws that guaranteed a judicial
forum for specific claims.63 Second, courts held that the FAA did
not allow arbitration of federal statutory claims, based on fears
that arbitration was not an appropriate forum for vindicating
those statutes’ public regulatory goals.64 Finally, courts harbored doubts about the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
standard form contracts of adhesion, which reflected uncertainty
in the law of contract about how to approach contractual boilerplate.65
The FAA has not been substantively amended since the 68th
Congress enacted it in 1925.66 Notwithstanding Congress’s inaction—and in spite of the “super-strong” form of stare decisis that
applies to Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes67—

62. See MACNEIL, supra note 32, at 134–38 (providing a historical overview
of the FAA from 1938 to 1967).
63. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 288 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (surveying caselaw prior to Southland Corp. v. Keating
Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and concluding that, “to judge from the reported cases,
it appears that no state court was even asked to enforce the statute for many
years after the passage of the FAA”).
64. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (declining
to give claim preclusive effect to an arbitration agreement because “[a]rbitral
procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII”); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 437 (1953) (reasoning that “the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers labor,” and that its “protective provisions . . . require the
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness”), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 447 (1989).
65. See Francis M. Dougherty, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting
Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 437 (1984)
(“Historically, agreements which purport to exclude jurisdiction of courts, other
than those specifically named, and which relate to the adjudication of controversies that might arise in the future, have been found to be against public policy and have not been enforced.”) For an introduction to modern economic theories supporting enforcement of contractual boilerplate, see Symposium,
“Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
66. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) derivation note.
67. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015)
(“[S]tare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute . . . . Congress can correct any mistake it sees.”). See generally William N.
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the Court rejected each of the above limitations in a series of decisions beginning in 1983.
The backdrop to these decisions was a marked increase in
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ litigation and inter-governmental
regulatory conflicts to which such litigation contributed.68 Between the end of the Second World War and 1983, Congress enacted more than 100 statutes that contained financial incentives
for private parties and their attorneys to enforce statutory
rights.69 During the same era, amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 and the extension of the equitable “common
fund” doctrine to class action litigation gave rise to new forms of
self-financing plaintiffs’ litigation organized by lawyers who conceived of themselves as “private attorneys general.”70 Meanwhile, the expansion of interstate and international trade increased the number of situations where private civil litigation
led to conflicts in different sovereigns’ approaches to regulating
cross-border activity.71 The perceived costs of entrepreneurial

Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988)
(identifying statutory stare decisis as a separate form of stare decisis).
68. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION
(2015) (discussing the development of class action litigation); Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015) (discussing the
growth of doctrines designed to limit U.S. courts’ influence on foreign affairs);
David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41 (2014)
(explaining how private civil litigation generates conflicts among state and national governments’ approaches to regulation).
69. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 66 fig.3.1 (2010).
70. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 1–24 (2017);
COFFEE, supra note 68, at 52–85; FARHANG, supra note 69, at 60–84; David
Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 610–14 (2013). On the common fund doctrine’s extension to class action litigation, see John P. Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1602–03
(1974); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 915–19 (1975); John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving
Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1974). On the private attorney general concept, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why
the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215
(1983); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General Is”—And
Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); see also David L. Noll, The Effect
of Contingent Fees and Statutory Fee-Shifting, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS
TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 170 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016)
(considering the efficacy of contingent attorney’s fees and rules providing for
statutory fee-shifting in increasing access to civil justice).
71. See Noll, supra note 68, at 49–56.
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litigation and interjurisdictional regulatory conflicts led influential commentators to argue for expanded use of alternative dispute resolution. Among them was Chief Justice Warren Burger,
who harbored an almost visceral dislike of the use of litigation to
address social problems.72 In a 1982 address to the annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Chief Justice Warren
Burger chronicled the supposed ills of the American civil justice
system and asked, pointedly, “Isn’t [t]here a [b]etter [w]ay?”73
Burger’s thinking soon appeared in Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp. and Southland Corp. v. Keating,
the Court stated in dicta and then held that the FAA reflects a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” that applies “in either state or federal court . . . notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”74 In
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon and Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court held
that the FAA allows arbitration of federal statutory claims in
both international disputes and those that arise from domestic
transactions.75 And the Court impliedly accepted that arbitra-

72. See generally SARAH L. STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 38–78 (2015) (discussing the
Chief Justice’s support of ADR to curb the influx of litigation).
73. Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
74. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (citing Cone).
In Cone, the Court considered whether a district court could abstain under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
from resolving a petition to compel arbitration when another petition based on
the same underlying controversy was pending in an earlier-filed state-court action. Justice William Brennan’s opinion stated, without citation, that FAA § 2
was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law
of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of
the Act.” Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. The Court reasoned that because the state and
federal court actions involved the same question of law (the agreement’s validity
under the FAA), “the fact that federal law provides the rule of decision on the
merits” weighed against federal court abstention. Id. at 23.
Southland directly considered whether the FAA preempted a provision of
California’s Franchise Investment Law which barred franchisees from agreeing
to arbitration was preempted by the FAA. Southland, 465 U.S. at 3, 8. Although
the franchisee waived the argument that the FAA does not apply outside of the
federal courts by failing to raise the argument in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court adopted the Cone dictum as a holding and concluded that state courts
were bound by FAA § 2. Id. at 15–17.
75. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987);
AND THE
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tion agreements contained in standard form contracts of adhesion had the same status as those contained in contracts negotiated by sophisticated parties.76
The “arbitration revolution”77 culminated in a pair of decisions which signaled that contracting parties have broad authority over the procedures used in arbitration. AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California doctrine
that required the availability of classwide arbitration in consumer cases as a check against corporate wrongdoing, because
the California doctrine conflicted with the FAA’s “purposes and
objectives.”78 And American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant held that, in a challenge to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the fact that arbitration makes it economically
irrational for a plaintiff to pursue a non-frivolous federal statutory claim (in Italian Colors, for violations of the Sherman Act)
is not a valid defense to enforcement of the arbitration agreement.79
The Court’s decisions expanding the scope of arbitration under the FAA openly embraced Burger’s view that channeling disputes to arbitration was the cure to the problem of entrepreneurial litigation and the regulatory conflicts that it created.80 By
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640
(1985).
76. The turning point in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which enforced a forum selection clause that appeared in the eighth of the twenty-five numbered paragraphs
attached to a cruise ticket. Id. at 588. Later arbitration cases impliedly accepted
the enforceability of boilerplate arbitration agreements or rejected contract law
challenges to validity of boilerplate agreements out of hand. See, e.g., Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531 (2012) (per curiam) (enforcing
a boilerplate arbitration clause that appeared in a nursing home admission contract); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97 (2012) (credit card
agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011)
(cellular telephone service agreement). For skepticism about the Court’s decision to apply the logic of classical contract law to adhesive arbitration clauses,
see for example Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:
Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and
Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1930 (2017).
77. See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the
Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 70–
76 (2015).
78. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
79. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013).
80. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997) (identifying the Court’s trends of internationalism and privatization); Noll, supra note 31, at 998–1002 (discussing
the benefits of enforcing arbitration).

2018]

ARBITRATION CONFLICTS

681

reinterpreting the FAA to apply in state courts, preempt inconsistent state law, and allow arbitration of statutory claims, the
Court ensured that defendants doing business in national and
international markets could channel litigation from local courts
to a private forum specified by contract.81 This change of forum
not only reduced procedural costs for defendants engaged in interstate and international commerce but also blunted the impact
of local regulation to the extent that arbitrators applied the law
less aggressively than elected state-court judges.82 At the same
time, the expansion of arbitration allowed defendants who are
regular targets of entrepreneurial litigation to disable much of
the procedural infrastructure such litigation depends upon, a result that conservative interest groups had struggled to attain
through legislation and court rulemaking.83 In Concepcion, the
Court reasoned, counter-historically, that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of

81. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (refusing to interpret FAA in a way that would “carv[e] out an important statutory
niche in which a State remains free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy”);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985) (describing an agreement to arbitrate as “an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
15–16 (1984) (stating that the Court was “unwilling to attribute to Congress the
intent . . . to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted”).
82. See Noll, supra note 68, at 68–72 (explaining why the Supreme Court’s
arbitration decisions fit into a broader line of decisions that aim to reduce interjurisdictional regulatory conflicts). There is a debate, not resolved by existing
empirical studies, over the extent of local courts’ favoritism toward local parties.
See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998) (discussing whether win rates are due to
removal of cases or case selection).
83. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,
Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377
(2005) (discussing judicial preference for arbitration); Noll, Regulating Arbitration, supra note 31, at 1026 (explaining how, “by changing the forum and procedures for dispute resolution,” arbitration can influence the returns from private
statutory enforcement); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 126 (2000) (anticipating the Court’s holding that arbitration can be used to
block class action litigation in certain circumstances). On conservative interest
groups’ use of judicial interpretation to accomplish results they struggled to
achieve through legislation and court rulemaking, see BURBANK & FARHANG,
supra note 70, at 214.
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dispute,” and held that a state law that interferes with this congressional objective is preempted by the FAA.84
The result was a “180-degree turn” in the Supreme Court’s
approach to arbitration under the FAA.85 In 1983, few U.S.
courts would have ordered arbitration of consumer or employee
disputes, much less when a state sought to guarantee access to
a judicial forum to advance the state’s regulatory interests.86 By
2013, arbitration of such disputes was common.87 And the Supreme Court repeatedly intervened to ensure that state courts
followed its interpretation of the FAA, summarily reversing
state court decisions that attempted to carve out exceptions to
the new FAA.88
This shift was reflected in discussion of the FAA. Law professors spoke of the FAA as if it were a quasi-constitutional enactment that steamrolled any legal impediment to the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.89
84. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). On Concepcion’s creative understanding of arbitration, see for example, Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323,
388 (2011) (“In the commercial world, there are numerous examples of arbitration procedures that specifically contemplate multi-party proceedings.”).
85. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights,
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 817 (2009).
86. See MACNEIL, supra note 32, at 138–39.
87. See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE
L.J. 2804, 2870–71 (2015) (discussing expansion of arbitration in the employment context).
88. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012)
(holding West Virginia’s prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is
preempted by the FAA); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012)
(per curiam) (holding an Oklahoma statute does not govern over a federal statute allowing arbitration); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011) (per curiam)
(holding that the FAA requires arbitration as to disputes where an arbitration
agreement is signed). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction
and the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3
(2014) (attributing the phenomenon to state court resistance to the Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence).
89. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1260 (2001) (noting that the “Supreme Court has construed the FAA
broadly, with a breadth sweeping well beyond the statute’s plain meaning and
the probable expectations of its framers in 1925”); see also Myriam Gilles, The
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
371, 409 (2016) (suggesting under the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, that
“entire areas of the law were shunted off into the black box of arbitration”); J.
Maria Glover, “Encroachments and Oppressions”: The Corporatization of Procedure and the Decline of Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2114 (2018)
(Under the new FAA, the judiciary no longer “fulfill[s] its unique role in our
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Arbitration supporters happily embraced this reading, and
claimed that a wide variety of federal and state law regulating
dispute resolution procedure was precluded or preempted by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA.90
2. The Agency Response
Businesses responded to the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the FAA by dramatically increasing their use of arbitration.91
But contrary to many accounts, the arbitration revolution did
not usher in an era of contract procedure in which businesses
were free to mandate arbitration on terms of their choosing. Instead, federal regulatory agencies stepped into the vacuum created by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA and regulated the use of arbitration in many domains.
Agency action regulating the use of arbitration came in two
waves. Two federal agencies—the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)—have long
regulated the use of arbitration by actors within their jurisdiction under statutes that do not expressly refer to arbitration.92
Until recently, this regulation has been uncontroversial. Indeed,

tripartite structure of government to preserve the rule of law”).
90. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16285) (“This Court has been loath to find that [another statute modifies the
FAA.]”); Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137
S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-285) (“[A] federal statute will not be interpreted to
forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it does so expressly . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING
USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1 (2017) (finding that 53.9% of nonunion private-sector employers in the United States have mandatory arbitration procedures); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 2, at 7 (2015) (finding that “[s]even of the eight
largest facilities-based mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of subscribers, used arbitration clauses in their 2014 customer agreements”); see also
Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
682, 708 (2018) (surveying prior empirical studies of employment arbitration
and concluding it is a “black hole” that serves primarily to suppress claims).
92. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness
in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 512–17 (2008) (describing the
SEC’s regulation of mandatory arbitration in the securities industry under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Lloyd, supra note 31, at 18–21 (describing the
history of the FTC’s regulation of mandatory arbitration under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act).
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the Supreme Court in 1987 spoke approvingly of the SEC’s oversight of securities arbitration in approving arbitration of claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.93
Beginning in the late 1990s and accelerating in the final
years of the Obama administration, a new wave of agency arbitration regulations appeared.94 Some agency regulations, such
as the CMS Long-Term Care Rule, sought to address harms
caused by the confidentiality of the arbitration process.95 Some
agency regulations, such as the NLRB rulings that the Supreme
Court rejected in Epic Systems, targeted uses of arbitration that
the agency concluded violated statutory rights it enforced.96
Other agency regulations attempted to address arbitration’s effects on private enforcement of state and federal regulatory programs.97 Still other regulations sought to address broader market failures linked to arbitration. For example, in response to the
collapse of several for-profit colleges, the Department of Education (DOE) Borrower Defense Rule prohibited schools that par-

93. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233–34
(1987) (“[T]he Commission has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the
rules adopted by the [self-regulatory organizations] relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory
rights.”).
94. See infra Appendix B.
95. See 82 Fed. Reg. 26,649 (proposed June 8, 2017) (proposing to drop the
arbitration bar in favor of a requirement that arbitration agreements be explained in “plain language”); Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016) (barring nursing homes from mandating arbitration in their admission contracts).
96. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292 (2012) (concluding that
an individual employment agreement that prevents the employee from participating in aggregate dispute resolution to the extent permitted by generally applicable procedural rules violates the employee’s right to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection under the NLRA and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts), enforced in part, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013), adhered to on reconsideration, Murphy Oil, 361 N.L.R.B. 774 (2014), enforcement
denied, Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). For the pertinent
statutory text, see supra note 5.
97. For instance, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) arbitration rule prohibited consumer financial companies from using arbitration
clauses to block class actions filed in public court based on concerns that arbitral
class action waivers brought enforcement of federal and state consumer protection laws below the optimal level. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210
(July 19, 2017), repealed by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017).
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ticipate in the federal direct loan program from mandating arbitration and using other contract provisions that interfered with
students’ ability to litigate predatory lending claims.98
In regulating arbitration, agencies drew on diverse statutory authorities. CMS issued the Long-Term Care Rule under a
provision of the Nursing Home Reform Act that directed the
agency to promulgate regulations “to protect the health, safety,
welfare, and rights” of nursing home residents.99 The NLRB
based its rulings prohibiting collective action waivers on provisions of the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia Act that guarantee
workers’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose
of . . . mutual aid or protection.”100 The DOE issued the Borrower
Defense Rule under a provision of the Higher Education Act that
authorizes the department to proscribe contractual provisions
for educational institutions that “the Secretary [of Education]
determines are necessary to protect the interests of the United
States and to promote the purposes of [the Act].”101 The CFPB
promulgated its arbitration rule under Section 1028(b) of the
Dodd-Frank Act, which expressly authorizes the bureau to “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties.”102 Agencies used a range of
administrative policymaking forms, from legislative rules under

98. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1,
2016) (final rule), amended by 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24, 2017). For an account of the rise of for-profit colleges and their dependence on predatory lending
financed by the federal government, see generally Blake Shinoda, Note, Enabling Class Litigation as an Approach to Regulating For-Profit Colleges, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1085 (2014) (discussing the regulation of for-profit schools and conditional funding to allow collective actions).
99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(f ) (1), 1396r(f ) (1) (2012).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”); 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (recognizing the public policy of the United
States that the individual worker “be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor . . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1087d(a)(6) (2012).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
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Section 553 of the APA to informal applications of agency discretion.103
By January 2016, fifteen proposed or final agency actions
regulated the use of arbitration.104 These regulations added to a
small number of statutes that expressly addressed the use of arbitration in particular domains105 and a handful of longstanding
agency arbitration regulations that predated the revolution in
the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence.106
The result was a variegated body of law in which the rules
governing arbitration depended on the parties, the type of contract they entered into, and the claims that the parties asserted.
In some areas, firms could be certain that arbitration agreements would be enforced according to their terms. Elsewhere,
the use of arbitration was constrained—sometimes prohibited—
by domain-specific agency regulation.
3. The Attack on Agency Regulation
Agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration were controversial.107 With a handful of exceptions, every agency action restricting the use of arbitration that became final between 2007
and the end of the Obama administration was challenged in
court by an assortment of business groups aligned with the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.108
The central theme of the challengers’ arguments was that
the FAA precluded agency regulation that restricted parties’
freedom to mandate arbitration on terms of their choosing.109 In
103. See, e.g., Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926
(legislative rule promulgated under APA § 553); Alison Frankel, Shareholder
Alert: SEC Commissioner Floats Class-Action-Killing Proposal, REUTERS (July
18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-arbitration-idUSKBN1A326T
(describing the SEC’s historical refusal to grant accelerated registration to initial public offerings where the issuer attempts to require arbitration of shareholder claims).
104. See infra Appendix B.
105. See infra note 110.
106. See Gross, supra note 92 (describing longstanding arbitration regulations of the SEC); Lloyd, supra note 31 (describing longstanding arbitration regulations of the FTC).
107. See Horton, supra note 18, at 369 (observing that the “flurry of [agency]
regulation may be the next battleground in the ‘arbitration war’”).
108. See infra Appendix A.
109. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Epic Sys.
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285); Brief for Chamber of Commerce Plaintiffs-Appellants at 59, Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885
F.3d 360 (2018) (No. 17-10238); Complaint at ¶¶ 100–132, Cal. Ass’n of Private
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a few recent statutes enacted after the revolution in the Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence was underway, Congress explicitly authorized agencies to regulate arbitration.110 But for the
most part, agencies regulated arbitration under statutes that establish substantive rights, direct an agency to regulate specific
harms or particular sectors of the economy, direct an agency to
police regulated actors’ contracting, or authorize an agency to
grant exemptions from regulatory requirements. Challengers
contended that regulations promulgated under the latter statutes conflicted with the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” and the FAA-based requirement that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms.111
Courts hearing the challenges splintered. For example, in
Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, a Texas district court upheld a
provision of the Department of Labor (DOL) Fiduciary Rule that
required investment advisors to forego using arbitral class action waivers as a valid exercise of DOL’s authority under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).112
By contrast, in Thrivent Financial Services for Lutherans v.
Acosta, a Minnesota district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the same provision based on a concession by the

Postsecondary Sch. v. Devos, No. 1:17-cv-00999, 2018 WL 5017749 (D.D.C. May
24, 2017) (No. 17-999).
110. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 8096,
131 Stat. 135 (2017) (forbidding defense contractors from requiring employees
to arbitrate claims for sexual assault and employment discrimination); DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)) (2012) (“No
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); id. § 922(a) (“No
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012)); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-234, § 11004, 122 Stat. 923 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a)) (“Any
livestock or poultry contract that contains a provision requiring the use of arbitration to resolve any controversy that may arise under the contract shall contain a provision that allows a producer or grower, prior to entering the contract
to decline to be bound by the arbitration provision.”).
111. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
112. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 3:16-CV-1476-M, 2017 WL
514424 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017), rev’d following partial concession of invalidity,
Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
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Sessions Justice Department to the effect that DOL lacked authority to regulate arbitration.113
Beyond disagreeing over the validity of particular agency
regulations, courts disagreed more broadly over the circumstances in which agencies have authority to regulate arbitration.
The Supreme Court in Epic Systems reasoned that the NLRB’s
regulation of arbitral class action waivers was invalid because
the NLRA does not contain a contrary congressional command
that modifies the FAA’s instruction that parties are free to select
arbitral procedures of their choosing.114 In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit in the decision below concluded that procedural choices
in an agreement to arbitrate are constrained by the guarantee of
workers’ right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, which has long been interpreted as prohibiting waivers of employees’ right to join together to petition for judicial and
administrative relief to the extent provided by generally applicable law.115 Because a waiver of that right is a “ground[] . . . at
law . . . for the revocation of any contract,” the court concluded
that it took precedence over the general commands of FAA Section 2.116
Questions about agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration
have played a central role in the Trump administration’s efforts
to roll back Obama-era arbitration regulations.117 For example,
after filing a petition for certiorari that took the NLRB’s side in
Epic Systems under President Obama,118 the solicitor general
switched positions after the change in administrations and filed
an amicus brief arguing that the board’s reading of the NLRA
was inconsistent with the FAA.119 In Fifth Circuit litigation over
the DOL Fiduciary Rule, the Justice Department declined to defend the district court decision upholding the rule’s arbitration

113. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Acosta, No. 16CV03289SRNDTS, 2017
WL 5135552, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2017).
114. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623–24 (2018).
115. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016).
116. Id.
117. See generally David L. Noll, Deregulating Arbitration, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 51 (2017).
118. Petition for Certiorari, NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 16-307
(Sept. 2016).
119. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285).
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provisions “[i]n light of the position adopted by the Acting Solicitor General in [Epic Systems].”120 The DOE, now led by billionaire philanthropist Betsy DeVos, cited “legal uncertainty” created by a legal challenge to the Borrower Defense Rule’s
arbitration provision as a reason for staying and then reconsidering the rule.121
Backers of Obama-era rules responded to agencies’ attempts
to rollback arbitration restrictions by challenging the rollbacks
under the APA. For example, state attorneys general have filed
two suits challenging the DOE’s attempt to roll back the Borrower Defense Rule and its refusal to enforce the original rule.122
The department has defended those suits on the ground that the
original rule’s arbitration provisions exceeded DOE’s statutory
authority.123 That defense joins issue on DOE’s authority to regulate arbitration, even as the department refuses to enforce a
regulation that is currently on the books.124
Thus, notwithstanding the change in administrations, the
extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration remains an
important and contested question. And the issue’s importance is
likely to increase. Historically, control of the executive branch
has shifted between the political parties frequently.125 When and
if a pro-regulatory administration assumes power, more agencies are likely to regulate arbitration under more statutes, giving
rise to new conflicts over their authority to do so.
120. Brief for Appellees at 59, Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885
F.3d 360 (2018) (No. 17-10238).
121. Student Assistance General Provisions, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24,
2017) (interim final rule).
122. Complaint, California v. Dep’t of Education, No. 3:17-cv-07106 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 14, 2017); Complaint, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-01331RDM (D.D.C. July 6, 2017).
123. See Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No.
1:17-cv-01331-RDM (Dec. 1, 2017) (citing “serious questions concerning the validity” of the Borrower Defense Rule raised by the California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools’ challenge to the rule as justification for staying it).
124. On September 12, 2018, the district court presiding over the Borrower
Defense rule litigation issued a preliminary injunction vacating the 2017 stay
of the rule on the ground that the stay was arbitrary and capricious. Bauer v.
DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2018). This injunction resulted in the original
2016 rule going into effect on October 12, 2018. Bauer v. DeVos, No. CV 17-1330
(RDM), 2018 WL 4483783, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2018). The district court has
indicated that it will address arguments that the 2016 rule is inconsistent with
the FAA at summary judgment. See Minute Order, Bauer v. DeVos, No. CV 171330 (RDM), 2018 WL 4483783 (D.D.C. May 24, 2018).
125. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL,
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at 1 (2d ed. 2005).
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B. AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ARBITRATION AS A PROBLEM OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Litigation over agency arbitration regulation highlights an
institutional dimension to the way that federal law approaches
arbitration.126 If courts reject agency arbitration regulation on
the ground that it is precluded by the FAA, the judiciary is the
only institution that will regulate arbitration.127 (Recall that
FAA preemption jurisprudence largely excludes states from regulating arbitration in ways that conflict with the FAA.)128 The
rules governing arbitration will reflect the courts’—ultimately,
the Supreme Court’s—reading of the FAA. In contrast, if courts
uphold agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration, courts and agencies will work together in a kind of partnership to define the
rules governing arbitration, the longstanding practice in the
area of securities arbitration.129
The institutional dimension to conflicts over agency arbitration regulation has led commentators to approach agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration as a problem of institutional
choice.130 Seen from this perspective, the question is not whether
agencies have legal authority to regulate arbitration but which
institution—the courts or an agency with subject-matter expertise—is better positioned to do so.131 Agency regulation can take
126. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
127. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1027–28 (observing that the “current system [for regulating arbitration], at least at the federal level, is not one of nonregulation or congressional control but rather a system characterized by delegation to the courts,” and that “the current system . . . is largely transsubstantive . . . what the Supreme Court says about the FAA in the context of
one area of law will also apply to another”).
128. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”).
129. See generally L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.2d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (“Courts and agencies are, after all, in a kind of partnership to serve the
public interest.”); Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of
Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 907–
08 (1980) (describing Judge Harold Leventhal’s vision of the court-agency partnership in administrative law).
130. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 995 (suggesting that in general “agencies’
ability to amass information about particular regulatory areas will often make
them better area-specific regulators than either the courts or Congress”).
131. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (“The central question is not ‘how, in
principle, should a text be interpreted?’ The question instead is ‘how should certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts?’”).
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advantage of agencies’ information-gathering abilities and technical expertise, and respond to changed circumstances more easily than a court’s interpretation of a statute.132 Insofar as the
rules governing arbitration raise contested questions of regulatory policy, agencies’ accountability to democratic politics
through the president potentially makes them a better site for
regulation than the federal courts.133 On the other hand, court
regulation is comparatively more stable than agency regulation.
It is better-insulated from electoral politics. And, so long as the
Supreme Court privileges the FAA over other federal laws, court
regulation captures the usual benefits of “procedural trans-substantivity”—the principle that disputes should be resolved using
the same procedures regardless of the substantive area in which
they arise.134
As a legal matter, however, the extent of an agency’s authority to regulate arbitration turns fundamentally on the FAA’s relationship to other laws. That “agencies may act only pursuant
to authority delegated to them by Congress” is a blackletter principle of administrative law.135 A statute authorizing an agency
to regulate harms such as nursing home abuse ordinarily would
authorize the agency to regulate uses of arbitration that impact
that mandate.136 Indeed, the difficulty of anticipating all the de-

132. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1030–31.
133. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865–66 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities.”).
134. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 767, 781 (2017) (“That procedural rules are cast at a broad level of generality and defined in advance of disputes by lawmakers who are unaware of
how their enactments will affect particular groups provides a powerful guaranty
of procedural fairness.”). See generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and
the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191 (2013) (noting that
trans-substantivity advances the values of generality and equality, protects
against political influence, capture, and bias, and lowers barriers to entry by
helping generalist lawyers to practice in different practice areas).
135. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
136. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that the
provision of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, that
authorized the SEC to regulate reorganization plans authorized the Commission to regulate management trading during reorganization); FTC v. RF Keppel
& Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (holding that the provision of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, that authorized FTC to regulate unfair methods
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velopments that might warrant regulation is a classic justification for Congress to delegate broad regulatory authority to an
agency that it charges with administering a statute in light of
contemporary conditions.137 But the delegations of regulatory
authority that agencies have invoked to regulate arbitration exist alongside the FAA’s instruction that agreements to arbitrate
are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”138 And the Supreme
Court has interpreted the FAA to require that covered arbitration agreements be enforced “according to their terms.”139
Agency regulation thus implicates conflicting statutory mandates: one that broadly supports agency action regulating arbitration (the substantive statute the agency bases its regulation
upon), and another that, as interpreted by the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, is broadly deregulatory (the FAA).
Hence, to understand the extent of agencies’ authority to
regulate arbitration, one must understand how the FAA relates
to other federal laws. Is the FAA the only federal statute that
governs the use and status of agreements to arbitrate? If not,
when do other statutes supplement or qualify the FAA? And
what must a statute say to qualify the FAA-based requirement
that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their
terms? These questions of statutory interpretation define the extent of parties’ authority to mandate arbitration on terms of
their own choosing, and the circumstances in which an agency
acting under a substantive regulatory statute may regulate the
use of arbitration.
II. THE FAA AS BASELINE
The remaining three Parts of this Article develop a theory of
how the FAA relates to other federal statutes, focusing specifically on substantive regulatory statutes that federal administra-

of competition permitted FTC to regulate “break and take” candy packaging).
137. See, e.g., RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE
BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1987) (“Government has assumed increasing responsibility in an ever-expanding number of issue areas in the twentieth century . . . . The sheer volume and technical complexity of the world are
more than Congress, with its limited membership and staff, can manage
alone.”); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (describing areas where “agencies have been left for
relatively long periods to adapt existing law to new challenges”).
138. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
139. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
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tive agencies have invoked to regulate arbitration. Some elements of that theory have been recognized in caselaw or prior
scholarship,140 but they have not been integrated into a general
theory of the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws. Developing such a theory and explaining its implications for administrative agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration are this Article’s primary contributions to debates over the limits and regulation of
arbitration.
Of course, understanding the FAA’s relationship to other
federal laws does not answer all questions about the appropriate
legal and policy response to arbitration. The Supreme Court’s
conclusion that the FAA’s “purposes and objectives” preempt
state regulation that the Court deems inconsistent with the FAA
remains controversial and undertheorized.141 And understanding the extent of agencies’ legal authority to regulate arbitration
does not answer whether they should do so as a policy matter.
Elsewhere, I have surveyed the economic arguments for judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration’s costs for
consumer welfare, democratic governance, and the implementation of federal statutory policy, and argued that federal legislation and regulation should focus on arbitration’s effects on the
implementation of federal statutory policy.142 The #MeToo movement has shed light on the role that arbitration has played in
shielding powerful actors from accountability for wrongdoing.143
In light of those revelations, and the policy coalitions they have
mobilized, the debate over the proper policy response to arbitration will continue.144

140. See infra notes 215–17 (noting Supreme Court cases that recognize that
the FAA may be displaced by a contrary congressional command); infra notes
244–48 (noting cases which hold that arbitrators must respect substantive
rights and statutory procedures and remedies).
141. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see, e.g., David Horton, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J.
1217 (2013); Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831,
1878–88 (2016).
142. See Noll, Regulating Arbitration, supra note 31.
143. See Ronan Farrow, Donald Trump, a Playboy Model, and a System for
Concealing Infidelity, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2018; Ronan Farrow, Harvey
Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 2017; Megan Twohey et
al., Weinstein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017.
144. See Letter from Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney Gen. of Fla. et al., to Paul
Ryan, Speaker of the House, Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Disputes (Feb. 12, 2018) (bi-partisan letter from fifty-six state attorneys general
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But first, there is the question of legal authority. If the FAA
precludes agencies from regulating arbitration in areas of their
authority, as arbitration supporters contend, then agencies are
powerless to regulate arbitration until Congress passes new legislation authorizing them to do so. On the other hand, if agencies
have authority to regulate arbitration under statutes they already administer, the questions are how that discretion should
be exercised, and whether agencies under Trump have abused
their discretion in rolling back Obama-era arbitration restrictions. The question of authority is also central to legal challenges such as Epic Systems, which are premised on the view
that the FAA takes precedence over conflicting laws.145
This Part begins by showing that the FAA functions as a
statutory floor: the statute establishes baseline rules of disputeresolution procedure that apply unless and until the Act is qualified by another law. And contrary to arbitration supporters’
claims, the FAA does not enjoy special status in federal law. Rather, basic principles of statutory interpretation and constitutional law show that it is a law like any other.
A. FLOOR OR CEILING?
The first question when considering the FAA’s relationship
to other federal laws is whether the FAA functions as a statutory
floor or ceiling.146 This distinction, which is commonly invoked
in preemption jurisprudence, captures the different ways that a
cross-cutting statute may interact with other laws.147 Some
cross-cutting statutes, such as the APA, establish default rules
that apply unless and until they are modified by another law.148
Others, such as the Endangered Species Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act, impose requirements that supersede other

urging Congress to enact “appropriately-tailored legislation to ensure that sexual harassment victims have a right to their day in court”).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 2–17.
146. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563 (2009).
147. See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND
THE REGULATORY STATE 173 (2d ed. 2017) (discussing the challenges of applying cross-cutting government-wide statutes in situations that lawmakers did
not explicitly contemplate).
148. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012); see Dimaren v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 398 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting that the Administrative Procedure Act “governs all administrative proceedings except to the extent
that another statute exempts the agency from coverage”). On the APA’s status
as a procedural default that applies in the absence of an “exemption,” see Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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laws.149 If the FAA functions as a floor, it establishes default
rules for dispute resolution that other statutes can modify. If the
FAA functions as a ceiling, its requirements trump those imposed by other federal laws.
Several factors show that the FAA functions as a floor, not
a ceiling. First, it is widely accepted that Congress enacted the
FAA to overcome the “judicial hostility to arbitration” reflected
in the common law revocability and unenforceability doctrines.150 There is no apparent reason why a statute intended to
overcome judicial hostility to arbitration would take precedence
over other federal laws enacted by Congress. Second, the FAA
lacks language specifying that it “applies to all Federal law”151
or that Federal departments and agencies “shall . . . insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by [them]” are consistent with the FAA.152 The presence of similar language in
statutes that function as a ceiling is evidence that the FAA does
not do so.
Congress’s legislative activity since the FAA’s enactment is
further evidence that it functions as a floor and not a ceiling. A
number of statutes, many enacted long after the FAA, establish
special rules governing the use of arbitration in particular domains.153 For example, 1982 amendments to the Patent Act provide that while parties may resolve patent infringement claims
by arbitration, an arbitration award resolving a patent infringement claim does not take effect until it is delivered to the Patent
and Trademark Office for recording in the patent’s prosecution
history.154 Under ordinary interpretive principles, these statutes
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which
is determined . . . to be critical . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) (2012) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).”); id. § 2000bb–2(1) (defining “government” as “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color
of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity”).
150. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (emphasis added).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3.
152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
153. See supra note 110.
154. Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 3(a), 96 Stat. 317, 322 (1982) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 294(c)-(e) (2012)) (“An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other
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modify the FAA’s general command that agreements to arbitrate
are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”155 That result would be
impossible if the FAA functioned as a statutory ceiling that
trumped other laws.
FAA Section 2’s savings clause, which provides that arbitration agreements are not enforceable for reasons that exist “at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” does identify one
situation in which the FAA’s general rules do not apply.156 Parties challenging agency arbitration regulations have pointed to
the savings clause to argue that, unless a law applies to contracts
generally, it cannot modify the FAA, and the Supreme Court in
Epic Systems appeared to embrace this argument.157 According
to this argument, the savings clause functions as a conflicts-oflaw rule. It says, by negative implication, that the only situation
in which another statute modifies the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution procedure is when the statute establishes a generally applicable contract law defense.
But this reading cannot be right. To see why, consider the
provision of the Patent Act noted above.158 If the savings clause
identified the only circumstance in which an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, the Patent Act would have no effect on
the validity of an arbitration award resolving a patent infringement claim, because the Act does not establish a defense to enforcement of “any contract.” That interpretation conflicts with
the ordinary and natural reading of the two acts. Its implausibility suggests that that the savings clause does not address the
FAA’s relationship to other federal laws but to the common law
person. . . . When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee
or licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Director. . . . The award
shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection (d) is received by
the Director.”).
155. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see, e.g., Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”); Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“[T]he more recent of two irreconcilably conﬂicting
statutes governs.”).
156. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
157. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“[A]n argument that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral arbitration is a different creature. A defense of that kind . . . is one that impermissibly
disfavors arbitration whether it sounds in illegality or unconscionability.”); cf.
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 33, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138
S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“Just as the saving clause was held not to encompass
the state-law rule at issue in Concepcion, it does not encompass the analogous
federal-law rule that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits derived from the NLRA.”).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c)–(d).
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of contracts. The clause says that, while Section 2 overrides the
common law non-enforceability and revocability doctrines, “a
party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to
avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement.”159
Were there any doubt about the matter, the Supreme Court
expressly held in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon
that the FAA functions as a statutory floor.160 McMahon was the
first case on the arbitrability of statutory rights that the Supreme Court decided after Mitsubishi rejected the view that statutory claims are categorically ineligible for arbitration.161 The
question was whether to extend Mitsubishi to domestic transactions,162 particularly whether parties could bind themselves to
arbitrate claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.163
The Court answered “yes,” reasoning in an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor that the FAA’s meaning did not vary
depending on the domestic or international nature of the transaction that gave rise to a demand for arbitration.164 This did not
mean that claims under federal regulatory statutes were automatically arbitrable, however. The Court reasoned that the FAA
“standing alone. . . mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.”165 But, “[l]ike any statutory directive,
the Arbitration Act’s mandate may be overridden by a contrary
congressional command.”166 The party opposing arbitration had
the “burden” of “show[ing] that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”167
“If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial
forum for a particular claim,” that intent would be “deducible

159. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984).
160. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
161. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
162. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 224.
163. Id. at 222.
164. See id. at 232 (reasoning that “the competence of arbitral tribunals to
resolve § 10(b) claims is the same” in both the domestic and international contexts).
165. Id. at 226.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 224, 227.
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from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying
purposes.”168
McMahon thus clarified what is plain from the FAA’s text,
structure, and other federal laws. The FAA establishes default
rules of dispute-resolution procedure that apply in the absence
of another law qualifying the FAA. “Like any statutory directive,” however, the FAA’s defaults may be modified by other
laws.169
B. DOES THE FAA OCCUPY A SPECIAL POSITION IN FEDERAL
LAW?
Opponents of agency arbitration regulation generally concede that the FAA functions as a statutory floor. But they contend that, even so, the FAA may only be modified by specific
kinds of statutory language. This argument posits that the FAA
functions as a “super-statute” that occupies a special place in
federal law. Because of its specialness, the FAA exerts a kind of
gravitational pull on federal law that favors arbitration. Although Congress is free to modify the FAA’s defaults in particular
domains, it must speak clearly if it wishes to do so.170
This argument, however, gives the FAA a status that the
statute itself does not contemplate, and that Congress could not
constitutionally confer on it. And arguments for treating the
FAA as a super-statute ignore the deep controversy that surrounds the Supreme Court’s expansion of arbitration under the
FAA and the fact that, with one exception, Congress has not embraced the Court’s expansion of the FAA. The upshot is that the
FAA is a statute like any other. Because arguments for treating
168. Id. at 227 (emphasis added) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
169. Id. at 226.
170. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18–19, Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (party seeking to show
that FAA has been displaced bears a “formidable burden. . . . When examining
text and legislative history, the Court has looked for evidence that Congress
intended to address arbitration agreements in particular ” ); Complaint at ¶ 20,
Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (No.
3:16CV233-MPM-RP) (“[W]hen Congress wishes to vest federal agencies with
the authority to regulate or prohibit the use of arbitration agreements in certain
industries, Congress has used unambiguous statutory language to confer that
authority.”). See also Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (16-285) (“[A] federal statute will not be interpreted to forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it does so expressly . . . .”).
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the FAA as a super-statute are unpersuasive, the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws presents an ordinary question of statutory interpretation.
1. Textual Silence
The most basic reason why the FAA does not enjoy special
status in federal law is that the statute says nothing about its
relationship to other federal laws. True, Section 2’s savings
clause provides that courts may refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements on generally applicable contract grounds.171 But as
shown above, that clause merely preserves common law contract
defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements rather
than addressing the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws.
The FAA’s silence about its relationship to other statutes is
unsurprising when the statute is considered in historical context. When the 68th Congress enacted the FAA, a total of thirteen executive agencies and departments existed.172 Federal
court procedure was controlled by the Conformity Act, an 1872
statute that directed federal courts to follow procedures used by
state courts.173
Congress had yet to enact major regulatory statutes that entered federal law during the New Deal and the many post-World
War II statutes that mobilized private enforcement through financial incentives for civil litigation.174 The Rules Enabling Act
would not be enacted for nine years, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for thirteen, and the APA for twenty-one.175 Before
any of these laws entered the U.S. Code, the nation would plunge

171. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
172. They were: the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, State, Defense,
Treasury, Commerce, and Labor; the Mississippi River Commission; the Federal Trade Commission; and the U.S. International Trade Commission. CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTS., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, SOURCEBOOK (Dec. 2012), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/
sourcebook.php.
173. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196.
174. See FARHANG, supra note 69, at 30 (describing mechanisms through
which financial incentives for litigation contribute to the development of a bar
of private lawyers who enforce public regulatory statutes).
175. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012)); Rules Enabling
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071–77 (2012)). For the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Cumulative Supplement V to the Code of the Laws of the United States of America 852–900 (1939).
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into depression and elect a new liberal government that undertook a massive reconfiguration of the national economy.176 Although it is inaccurate to describe the pre-New Deal government
as thoroughly laissez-faire,177 the federal regulatory state was
early in development. In this environment, there was little reason for Congress to have been concerned with the FAA’s relationship to other federal regulatory statutes. The administrative
state was in its infancy. The modern “litigation state” created by
Congress’s delegations of enforcement authority to private litigants and their lawyers did not exist.178
Nor could Congress have given the FAA a special position in
federal law if it had wished to do so: “[j]ust as a corporate board
of directors cannot adopt an immutable policy, legislators cannot
make their laws irrepealable or disable themselves or their successors from taking action[.]”179 This non-entrenchment principle reflects the co-equal status of different Congresses and is itself an entrenched feature of federal constitutional law.180 Under
it, “there is no legal effect to a statutory provision stating that
any exceptions to the statute’s requirements must be express, or

176. See Nicholas Crafts & Peter Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, 26 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 285, 303–06 (2010).
177. See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, 10–15 (2016); JERRY L. MASHAW,
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13–14 (2012); see also Maggie
McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE
L.J. 1538, 1579 (2018).
178. See generally FARHANG, supra note 69 (noting the low rate of private
statutory enforcement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
179. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 278 (2012).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872–73 (1996)
(plurality opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932). See generally Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment
and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381–93 (1987) (defining the
entrenchment principle and discussing its practical concerns); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J.
491, 509 (1997) (noting that entrenchment violates “the democratic principle
that present majorities rule themselves”); John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and
Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2003) (“[C]onventional wisdom is
that . . . one legislature cannot bind a future legislature.”). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002) (arguing “that the rule barring legislative entrenchment
should be discarded; legislatures should be allowed to bind their successors,
subject to any independent constitutional limits in force”).
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must specifically refer to the statute.”181 Thus, even if the FAA
contained a provision stating that it controls unless it is expressly modified, that provision would be a nullity.
2. Arguments from Arbitrability Jurisprudence
The central legal argument for approaching the FAA as if it
occupied a special place in federal law is based on the Supreme
Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence—the body of law that addresses disputes that may be resolved via arbitration.182 After
the Court abandoned its view that the FAA categorically excludes arbitration of statutory claims in Mitsubishi, it had to explain which statutory claims could be arbitrated.183 As already
noted, McMahon held that the FAA generally requires arbitration of statutory claims that are covered by a valid arbitration
agreement, and that a “contrary congressional command” could
qualify this requirement.184 The Court then decided a series of
cases holding that claims under particular statutes were arbitrable because they lacked a sufficiently clear congressional command to modify the FAA.185 Opponents of agency arbitration regulation draw on these cases to argue that, unless a statute
specifically mentions arbitration, it does not affect the FAA.186

181. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 179, at 279 (citing the APA’s conflict-oflaws clause, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012), as an example of such a provision).
182. See generally Deborah Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and
Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381,
383–93 (2018) (describing the Supreme Court’s expansion of arbitrability under
the FAA); see also David L. Noll, Response: Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477 (2018) (considering the possibility that arbitrability be
tied to the public or private nature of disputes).
183. See Mark A. Cleaves, An Irresistible Force Meets an Immovable Object:
Reforming Current Standards as to the Arbitration of Statutory Claims, 8 J.L.
& COM. 245, 262 (1988).
184. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 (1987).
185. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Repair Organizations Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933) (overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
186. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“Bilateral arbitration agreements should be enforced absent a specific congressional
command to the contrary.”); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“When . . . a party maintains that another
federal statute provides grounds for invalidating an arbitration agreement, this
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But the Supreme Court’s arbitrability cases do not hold that
a statute must use magic words to qualify the FAA. To the contrary, those cases have long recognized that other statutes may
impliedly modify the FAA, most obviously when they establish
rules governing primary conduct (e.g., prohibiting discriminatory employment practices) or establish specific procedures and
remedies for statutory claims.187 An arbitration agreement that
waived those rights would be enforceable if it were judged under
the FAA alone provided it did not violate generally applicable
contract-law principles. But the Court’s long-standing and oftstated view is that, where an agreement’s “choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operate[] in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” the
agreement cannot be enforced.188
Opponents of agency arbitration regulation also invoke the
canon against implied repeals to argue that Congress must expressly authorize departures from the FAA.189 But this argument distorts the canon.
The implied-repeals canon holds that “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.”190 It represents a judicial rule-of-thumb for cases where the legislature
enacted a law that addresses a specific problem and then enacted
a more general law that conflicts with the earlier law. The canon
teaches that in these circumstances, the later and more general
Court has asked whether the other federal statute contains a ‘contrary congressional command’ overriding the FAA’s mandate that arbitration agreements be
enforced according to their terms.”).
187. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013)
(reasoning that when “Congress has taken some measures to facilitate the litigation of [particular] claims,” those measures must be followed in arbitration);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”).
188. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
189. See, e.g., Brief for Epic Systems Corporation and Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
at 14, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285); Complaint
at ¶ 20, Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss.
2016) (No. 3:16CV233-MPM-RP); see also Richard A. Nagareda, The LitigationArbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069,
1093 (2011) (“Like implied repeals of statutes generally, implied repeals of the
FAA are disfavored, such that the inclusion of a private right of action in another statute—even an unwaivable right—will not operate to displace the
FAA.”).
190. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010) (quoting Hawaii v. Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009)).
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law does not override (repeal) the earlier law unless finding an
implied repeal is the only way to give effect to the later-enacted
statute.191 As the Supreme Court has explained, the rationale for
the rule is that the later legislature would not intend its handiwork to take priority over the earlier enactment, even though
the later enactment’s literal language can be read as doing so:
[W]hen the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a
subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general
terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly
contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to
affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is
absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order
that its words shall have any meaning at all.192

The FAA is not the kind of statute that the implied-repeals
canon aims to protect against accidental repeal. Far from addressing a specific problem, the FAA’s cross-cutting, government-wide commands were enacted to override the general hostility to arbitration reflected in the common law revocability and
unenforceability doctrines.193 From the perspective of the implied-repeals canon, it is natural that later statutes enacted to
address specific regulatory problems would qualify the FAA’s
cross-cutting commands.
3. The FAA as “Super-Statute”
Apart from textual and legal arguments for requiring Congress to use specific language if it wishes to modify the FAA, one
might argue that the FAA has acquired the status of a superstatute. On this view—advanced by both critics and supporters
of the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence—the FAA occupies a

191. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Def. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 663
(2007); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976). Descriptions of the canon in other cases can be read as stating that it establishes a kind
of general presumption against statutory change, which protects earlier-enacted laws against being modified until they are expressly repealed. See, e.g.,
Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010) (“As we have emphasized, repeals
by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of
the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.” (quoting Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 174 (2009))). But this understanding of the statute
is ahistorical and is in tension with the principle that one legislature may not
insulate its enactments from modification by another.
192. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153 (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
98 (2d ed. 1874)).
193. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625–27.
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place between that of a normal statute and a constitutional enactment.194 Because the FAA is, de facto, higher law, it controls
the treatment of arbitration unless Congress makes unmistakably clear that it wishes to depart from the FAA’s defaults.
But the FAA is not a super-statute. Although scholars disagree over the conditions in which a statute acquires “super” status,195 a helpful guide is provided by Professor William Eskridge
and John Ferejohn’s exhaustive recent treatment of the subject.
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that the transition from ordinary to
super-statute reflects a process of deliberation, implementation,
and entrenchment that cements a statute’s normative commitments in legal and popular culture. In their telling, “[e]very super-statutory policy begins with an important public need and,
usually, strong political demand.”196 Policy entrenchment usually involves administrators and courts finding “practical and
cost-effective ways to implement the putative super[-]statute”
and “ways to appeal to the values and concerns held by opponents.”197 And “the emerging super-statute must be sufficiently
valuable to an important and expanding group in American society that it generates an enthusiastic and dynamic and growing
base of popular support.”198 Popular and ambitious laws mature
into super-statutes via “repeated legislative refinement and reaffirmation of the new norm or institution over a period of
time.”199 It is only when this entrenchment has occurred that, on
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account, courts should interpret the
statute expansively to accomplish its purposes.200
Eskridge and Ferejohn identified the FAA as a super-statute in their tentative 2001 treatment of the subject201 but omitted it from their longer 2010 monograph, and for good reason.
194. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
195. See Robert A. Katzmann, Introduction to The Yale Law Journal Online
Symposium on Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 293 (2011), https://www.yalelawjour
nal.org/forum/introduction-to-the-yale-law-journal-online-symposium-on
-eskridge-and-ferejohns-a-republic-of-statutes-the-new-american-constitution.
196. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 34, at 16–17.
197. Id. at 17.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 17–18.
200. See id. at 465 (suggesting that in the event of ambiguity, interpreters
should consider “meta-purposes suggested by small ‘c’ constitutional goals and
norms”); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1249 (“For super-statutes,
which are to be construed liberally and purposively, interpreters should apply
words broadly and evolutively . . . .”).
201. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1261–63.
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Recent historical research has shown that while the FAA
emerged from a lengthy lobbying campaign, it was also classic
interest-group legislation, enacted to address turn-of-the-century merchants’ difficulties in using arbitration to resolve timesensitive disputes.202 The statute’s opponents have decidedly not
been brought into the fold as the Court has expanded the scope
of arbitration to retrench statutes enforced through private civil
litigation,203 nor, as detailed above, have courts uniformly embraced agencies’ efforts to reconcile the FAA with regulatory regimes they administer.204 And while the modern FAA enjoys
strong support of interest groups that oppose regulation of the
private sector, the FAA decidedly lacks a dynamic and growing
base of popular support.205 Nor has Congress embarked on a program of refining and reaffirming the FAA: where it has acted,
Congress has worked at the margins, trimming or expanding the
availability of arbitration in particular domains as part of substantive regulatory overhauls or in response to interest group
pressure.206 Congress’s most significant intervention in recent
decades—the repeal of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s arbitration rule—passed by a razor-thin margin and depended on the Congressional Review Act to overcome the vetogates that ordinarily slow the progress of procedural legislation.207
It might be argued that the “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements” shows that the FAA should exercise the
202. See SZALAI, supra note 49, at 34–51, 184 (describing how early arbitration reform bills that evolved into the FAA emerged from the New York Chamber of Commerce’s arbitration committee, formed initially in response to the
failings of the New York courts revealed by the 1907 Bankers’ Panic and recounting the celebration held at Mr. and Mrs. Vincent Astor’s Fifth Avenue
mansion upon the FAA’s enactment); see also STASZAK, supra note 72, at 53 (noting that the FAA was supported by “leaders from regional chambers of commerce and leading members of the ABA”).
203. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Demolished Labor
Rights, SLATE (May 21, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/neil
-gorsuch-demolished-labor-rights-in-epic-systems-v-lewis.html (describing the
Epic Systems decision as “a frontal attack on the New Deal” that “effectively
legalizes wage theft”).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
205. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
“Privatization of the Justice System”, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1.
206. See infra Appendix A.
207. Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017); see David L. Noll, The Dangerous Consequences of Repealing the CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, REG. REV.
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/noll-repealing
-arbitration-rule.

706

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:665

gravitational pull exercised by super-statutes.208 But that judicially recognized policy is an interpretation of the FAA alone. As
the Court reasoned in Moses H. Cone, “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”209 It does not purport to describe the FAA’s relationship to other laws.
There, of course, remains the fact that “the Supreme Court
has construed the FAA broadly, with a breadth sweeping well
beyond the statute’s plain meaning and the probable expectations of its framers in 1925.”210 But this is not evidence that the
FAA occupies a privileged position in federal law under an accepted theory of statutory interpretation. It is, rather, evidence
that the Court has interpreted the FAA dynamically and aggressively, to address perceived problems with civil litigation in U.S.
courts.
The Supreme Court’s interpretive creativity in cases such as
Southland, Mitsubishi, and Concepcion may be evidence of the
general approach it is likely to take toward future arbitration
conflicts, assuming that its membership remains stable and that
its arbitration jurisprudence is not disrupted by legal or political
shocks. But the Court’s past creativity is neither a reliable nor
normatively attractive guide to the FAA’s relationship to other
laws. The Court’s arbitration decisions have been characterized
by shifting coalitions of Justices and a peculiar combination of
statutory literalism and Burger-Court purposivism.211 Although
the current majority has solidified around an anti-class-action
reading of the FAA, there is reason to think that majority will
not hold in the long term.212
208. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
209. Id. But see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989) (noting the Court’s “current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas did not cite any statutes other than the
FAA that favor resolving legal disputes through arbitration.
210. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 89, at 1260.
211. See generally Moses, supra note 49, at 122–54 (analyzing the Court’s
arbitration cases).
212. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632–33 (2018) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (following Justice Thomas’s Concepcion concurrence); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advancing an idiosyncratic interpretation of the FAA that preempts laws regulating arbitral collective action waivers while rejecting the majority’s reliance on
“purposes-and-objectives pre-emption”); Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubioius About Enforcing Arbitration Agreements for Transportation
Workers, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/
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More fundamentally, that the Court in past cases “has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act” is not a license for it to continue to do so in the future.213 Decisions interpreting the FAA to
allow arbitration of statutory claims, preempt state law, and immunize procedural choices from judicial second-guessing oversight do not answer the questions of statutory interpretation presented by conflicts between the FAA and substantive regulatory
statutes. To answer those questions, the Court will be required
to reconcile the FAA with other statutes that bear on the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate. The expansive, textually-unconstrained mood of the Court’s past decisions is no reason for it
to avoid deciding those cases on the merits, using traditional
tools of statutory interpretation.
In short, there is no legitimate reason for concluding that
the FAA occupies a special place in federal law. The statute says
nothing to indicate that it takes precedence over other laws, the
Court’s arbitrability cases deal with a different problem, and the
FAA lacks the defining characteristics of a super-statute. Instead, as McMahon recognized, the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution procedure function “[l]ike any statutory directive.”214
III. THE EFFECT OF OTHER LAWS
The prior Part demonstrated that the FAA establishes default rules governing the status of arbitration agreements and
that the FAA does not enjoy a special place in federal law. Once
these points are recognized, the question is when another statute
modifies the FAA.
Under ordinary interpretive principles, that question depends on the text, structure, and purpose of statutes that bear

argument-analysis-justices-dubious-about-enforcing-arbitration-agreements
-for-transportation-workers/ (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice
Gorsuch’s defection from the “pro-arbitration” position in Oliveira v. New
Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018)). See
generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(rejecting practice of “invalidat[ing] state laws based on perceived conflicts with
broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law” on the
ground that it is unconstitutional).
213. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”).
214. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
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on the use of arbitration in particular domains and on those statutes’ functional relationship to the FAA.215 In particular, a statute that is more specific than the FAA—or that was enacted after
the FAA and conflicts irreconcilably with it—supersedes the
FAA under the specific-over-general and last-in-time canons.216
Those principles show that the FAA is not only modified by
statutes that expressly address the status of arbitration in particular domains—a point that is widely accepted in the doctrine
and scholarship—but also is impliedly modified by a wide range
of federal laws. There is, however, an important category of statutes that do not modify the FAA’s default rules. In contrast to
most scholarship that has considered the question, this Article
shows that statutes that merely charge an agency with administering a statute in general terms—the subject of the Supreme
Court’s Chevron decision—do not modify the FAA.
This Part describes the statutes that expressly and impliedly modify the FAA. Part IV then turns to Chevron and explains why it is irrelevant to agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration.
A. EXPRESS QUALIFICATIONS
1. Statutes Expressly Addressing the Validity, Enforceability,
or Revocability of Agreements to Arbitrate
The statutes that most obviously modify the FAA are those
that expressly address the validity, enforceability, or revocability of agreements to arbitrate. For example, the Patent Act
amendments noted above provide that, while parties may agree
to arbitrate patent infringement claims, an arbitration award resolving infringement claims is not enforceable until it is delivered to the Patent and Trademark Office.217

215. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1621–32 (relying on these guides
to statutory meaning to analyze the NLRA’s relationship to the FAA); POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2237–42 (2014) (same; Lanham Act and Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act).
216. See infra notes 218–20.
217. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012). Similarly, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 provides that “[a]ny livestock or poultry contract that contains
a provision requiring the use of arbitration to resolve any controversy that may
arise under the contract shall contain a provision that allows a producer or
grower, prior to entering the contract to decline to be bound by the arbitration
provision.” 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (2012). And the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act provides:
“No residential mortgage loan . . . may include terms which require arbitration
or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy
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“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.”218 And when laws enacted at different
times irreconcilably conflict, the later law controls.219
Under these principles, statutes such as the Patent Act take
precedence over the FAA. These statutes conflict with the FAA
insofar as they require a result other than enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. But they generally
were enacted after the FAA. And they are more specific than the
FAA, both in terms of their literal language and the problem that
they address. Thus, the statutes control where they apply.220
2. Statutes that Delegate Authority to Regulate Arbitration to
an Administrative Agency
Only slightly more complicated than statutes that expressly
address the validity, revocability, or enforceability of specific
agreements to arbitrate are statutes that delegate authority to
an administrative agency or executive department to regulate
the use of arbitration. For instance, Section 1028(b) of the DoddFrank Act provides that the CFPB, “by regulation, may prohibit
or impose conditions or limitations” on consumer financial companies’ use of arbitration if the bureau finds doing so “is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”221 DoddFrank Section 921 similarly authorizes the Securities Exchange
Commission to regulate the use of arbitration by securities brokers and dealers.222

or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1)
(2012).
218. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); see also
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 179, at 183 (explaining that the general/specific
canon recognizes that “the specific provision comes closer to addressing the very
problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of credence” and
that “the particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact view
of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.”
(quoting 3 Jeremy Bentham, A Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 210 (John Bowring ed., 1843))).
219. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
220. See, e.g., Oldham v. O.K. Farms, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1320 (E.D.
Okla. 2016) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that was invalid under
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008); Nationstar Mortg., LLC v.
West, 785 S.E.2d. 634, 641 n.14 (W. Va. 2016) (noting that as a result of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of arbitration agreements in mortgage loan contracts, “mandatory arbitration clauses can no longer be included in residential
home loans”).
221. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2012) (“The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or
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These statutes post-date the FAA and are more specific than
it. Thus, they qualify the FAA for the same reasons that statutes
that expressly address the enforceability of specific arbitration
agreements do so.223 Compared to statutes that directly address
the status of arbitration agreements, they differ only in that they
delegate regulatory authority to an administrative agency or department instead of legislating directly. That is a common design
choice in modern regulatory legislation, whose constitutionality
has been accepted since the late New Deal.224
Critics have argued that statutes which allow an agency to
regulate the use of arbitration violate the non-delegation doctrine because they authorize an institution other than Congress
to amend the FAA.225 But that argument misunderstands what
statutes such as Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act do. That
section authorizes the CFPB to regulate uses of arbitration that

impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate
any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the
rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization
if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in
the public interest and for the protection of investors.”). Under the Securities
Exchange Act, “[t]he term ‘broker’ means any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4)(A). A “‘dealer’ means any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
223. See supra notes 218–20.
224. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (“The Constitution
as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every
fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for
Congress itself properly to investigate.”); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 115–16 (1999) (surveying statutes
that delegate regulatory authority to executive branch institutions in the postWorld War II era).
225. See John Villa & Ryan Scarborough, The Law of Unintended Consequences: How the CFPB’s Unprecedented Legislative Authority and Enforcement
Approach Has Invited Increasing Challenges, 35 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 22,
26 (2016) (suggesting that Congress “abdicated” its constitutional responsibilities in delegating authority to regulate arbitration to the CFPB). See generally
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (summarizing modern non-delegation doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (cataloguing ways in which non-delegation concerns influence statutory interpretation and judicial review of agency actions).
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are generally allowed under the FAA.226 Such a statute no more
amends the FAA than one authorizing an agency to regulate
anti-competitive trade practices amends the provision of the
Coinage Act providing that U.S. currency is legal tender for all
debts, public and private.227 In both cases, a cross-cutting statute
establishes general rules of play for the market. A more specific,
later-enacted statute qualifies parties’ freedom of action by authorizing an agency to regulate forms of contracting that, in Congress’s view, create risks that require regulation. Regulation
that operates in this manner is not a problem of constitutional
dimensions, but the stuff of ordinary administrative law.
3. The Relevance of Statutes that Expressly Modify the FAA
Although statutes that expressly qualify the FAA do not present difficult interpretive issues, critics of agency arbitration
regulation invoke them to argue that if Congress wishes to restrict parties’ freedom to arbitrate or authorize an agency to regulate arbitration, it “knows how to override the FAA.”228 Like the
argument that the FAA functions as a super-statute, this argument seeks to narrow or eliminate the circumstances in which
other laws bear on agreements to arbitrate, again through a rule
requiring Congress to speak clearly to displace the FAA’s defaults.229
An initial problem with this argument is that it fails to account for the many statutes that impliedly modify the FAA by
establishing rules governing primary conduct.230 As discussed
below, scores of statutes limit parties’ freedom to arbitrate on
terms of their own choosing by establishing substantive rights

226. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement . . . providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
227. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012) (“United States coins and currency
(including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks
and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and
dues.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (authorizing the FTC to prevent parties doing
business in interstate commerce “from using unfair methods of competition”).
228. Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 7, 9,
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285) (“[A] federal statute
will not be interpreted to forbid arbitration of claims within its ambit unless it
does so expressly . . . .”).
229. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285).
230. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.

712

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:665

that must be respected in arbitration. The most persuasive explanation is that those statutes impliedly modify the FAA’s requirement that agreements to arbitrate be enforced according to
their terms.231
The more fundamental problem with the argument is that
it places a burden on Congress that makes no sense when the
development of federal arbitration law is viewed in historical
context.232 For most of the twentieth century, there was no reason for Congress to expressly address how new regulatory legislation modified the FAA. It was not until the mid-1980s that the
Supreme Court reinterpreted the FAA to allow arbitration of federal statutory claims that arose out of actions in the United
States,233 not until the 1990s that the Court accepted arbitration
agreements contained in boilerplate attached to standard form
contracts of adhesion,234 and not until the past decade that the
Supreme Court delineated the extent of contract drafters’ control
over the procedures used in arbitration.235 Understandably fail-

231. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
232. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 178
(2008) (holding that when interpreting a statute, a federal court “must take into
account its contemporary legal context” (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979))).
233. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640
(1985).
234. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in “a standard form franchise agreement for the
operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (enforcing arbitration clause contained in
“a lifetime ‘Termite Protection Plan’”). The Supreme Court did not explicitly accept the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standard form consumer contracts until AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s deeply controversial decision in Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
proclaimed “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than
adhesive are long past.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47.
235. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2013)
(concluding that an arbitration agreement’s effects on plaintiffs’ ability to assert
a claim for violation of the Sherman Act were not a defense to its enforcement);
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343 (FAA preempts “state-law rules that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”). But cf. Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 572–73 (2013) (recognizing an arbitrator’s
authority to conduct class proceedings where agreement that is silent on class
arbitration gives arbitrator all the powers of a court).
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ing to anticipate that parties could require arbitration of statutory claims and agree to arbitrate through standard form boilerplate, lawmakers were content for most of the twentieth century
to legislate substantive rights and policies. It was only after the
revolution in the Court’s FAA jurisprudence—a shift in the background rules of dispute resolution procedure that originated in
the Supreme Court, not Congress—that Congress began to address arbitration expressly in statutes such as the Dodd-Frank
Act.236
B. IMPLIED QUALIFICATIONS
Because of the dynamic just described, the majority of statutes that modify the FAA will not do so expressly, but impliedly.
Precisely when a statute impliedly qualifies the FAA is contested. As Part I noted, some courts have concluded that a substantive regulatory statute allows an administrative agency to
regulate uses of arbitration that negatively impact the statute,
while other courts deny that regulatory statutes have this effect.237 Legal uncertainty over the circumstances in which substantive regulatory statutes qualify the FAA is a focal point in
cases such as Epic Systems as well as in battles over the Trump
administration’s efforts to deregulate arbitration.238
Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation,
this section demonstrates that a federal statute impliedly qualifies the FAA in four circumstances: (1) when the statute establishes rules governing parties’ primary conduct; (2) when the
statute establishes specific procedures or remedies for statutory
claims; (3) when the statute authorizes an administrative agency
to police regulated parties’ contracting to prevent a harm that
Congress determined warrants regulation; and (4) when the
statute charges an agency with implementing a specific statutory policy that is affected by the use of arbitration.
In each of these circumstances, ordinary interpretive principles show that the substantive regulatory statute modifies the
FAA’s default rules of dispute procedure. In the third and fourth
scenarios, agency regulation limiting the use of arbitration
236. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (observing that statutes which expressly address the use of arbitration were “enacted during the time this Court’s decisions increasingly alerted
Congress that it would be wise to leave not the slightest room for doubt if it
wants to secure access to a judicial forum or to provide a green light for group
litigation before an arbitrator or court”).
237. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; supra note 212.
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draws its authority from statutes that qualify the FAA’s defaults.
1. Statutes Governing Primary Conduct
The first situation where a statute impliedly qualifies the
FAA is when it lays down rules governing primary conduct such
as Title VII’s prohibition of discriminatory employment practices.239 An agreement to arbitrate might purport to bar parties
from asserting claims for violations of those rules.240 Alternatively, the arbitration agreement itself might violate the conduct-regulating rule—say, by instructing the arbitrator to discriminate against women.241 And a party seeking to compel
arbitration might contend that the agreement is valid and enforceable by reason of FAA Section 2.242
It is a mainstay of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, however, that substantive statutory rights survive the
switch from litigation to arbitration.243 In Mitsubishi, the Court
reasoned that “a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute” by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims;
it “only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.”244 In so holding, Mitsubishi approached arbitration as if it were merely another court, one that follows the traditional choice-of-law principle that a court may apply its own
procedures in cases governed by another sovereign’s substantive
law.245
Why do substantive rights survive the switch from litigation
to arbitration? One might argue that following the applicable
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (providing that it is “an unlawful employment practice” for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
240. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)
(describing arbitration rules that required employees to follow notice procedures that were not required by law).
241. Cf. EEOC v. Doherty Enters., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (discussing the EEOC’s position that an employer’s use of arbitration
formed part of a broader pattern of employment discrimination).
242. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
243. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013).
244. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977) (“A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another
state to resolve other issues in the case.”).

2018]

ARBITRATION CONFLICTS

715

substantive law is simply inherent in what arbitration is.246 This
argument posits that when Congress provided in the FAA that
an arbitration agreement shall be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” it adopted a quasi-judicial model of arbitration and
impliedly instructed arbitrators to follow the law.247
But the suggestion that Congress adopted this understanding of arbitration in the FAA does not stand up to scrutiny. A
central historical rationale for arbitration was to allow parties to
resolve disputes without observing legal “formalities.”248 And arbitration could only perform this function if the arbitrator were
free to resolve disputes according to extra-legal standards.249 Decisions from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus
described arbitrators operating essentially free of law: “Arbitrators are a law unto themselves and may decide according to their
views of justice.”250 In her study of the nineteenth century origins of mandatory securities arbitration, Professor Jill Gross

246. See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a
Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 45 (1999) (noting that modern
arbitration procedures increasingly follow a “judicialized model,” which resembles litigation); Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (1996) (“[L]itigation and securities arbitration
have become mirror images of one another.”); Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1438–39 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of securities arbitration procedures as
“sufficiently capable” of protecting statutory rights).
247. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); cf. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v.
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (“In the absence of contrary indication, we
assume that when a statute uses such a term, Congress intended it to have its
established meaning.”).
248. See Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 602 (1934); cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 137, 151 (2011) (“[N]ineteenth century arbitration served two distinct purposes—to provide courts with adjuncts and to allow parties to make their own
arrangements for resolving disputes. Because the former purpose brought arbitrators into closer union with judges, arbitrator rulings were subject to review
for legal errors. In contrast, common law arbitrations were treated as inventions
of the disputing parties. Therefore, courts only reviewed these awards for gross
procedural defects, such as arbitrator corruption.”).
249. Phillips, supra note 250, at 602.
250. Mayberry v. Mayberry, 28 S.E. 349, 349 (N.C. 1897); cf. Underhill v.
Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 339, 361 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (“If every award must be
made conformable to what would have been the judgment of this Court in the
case, it would render arbitrations useless and vexatious, and a source of great
litigation; for it very rarely happens that both parties are satisfied.”). Julius
Cohen adopted a similar view testifying in favor of the FAA: “[T]he right of freedom of contract, which the Constitution guarantees to men, includes the right
to dispose of any controversy which may arise out of the contract in their own
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concluded that the New York Stock Exchange required members
to arbitrate customer disputes “to ensure that industry norms
would be enforced, even if those norms were unlawful and not
enforceable in court, and secondarily to provide a rapid resolution of a dispute whose value changed quickly as the stock market rose or fell.”251 Viewed against the backdrop of this historical
usage, the 1925 FAA cannot plausibly be read as adopting a
quasi-judicial model of arbitration.252 “Arbitration,” as known in
the early twentieth century, did not necessarily entail fidelity to
law.
Even if the FAA does not adopt a judicial model of arbitration, one could argue that every arbitration agreement contains
an implied term directing the arbitrator to follow the applicable
substantive law.253 On this view, the arbitrator applies relevant
substantive law not because doing so is inherent in the nature of
arbitration, but because the parties have directed the arbitrator
to do so. But this argument is also ahistorical.254 And it does not
explain why arbitrators must respect substantive rights even
when the arbitration agreement directs them to resolve disputes
according to a nonlegal standard, as Mitsubishi contemplated
and many courts have held.255
fashion.” Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, supra note 51, at 18
(testimony of Julius Cohen).
251. Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor
Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 176 (2016).
252. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (“[Arbitration] is not the proper method
for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions
or policy in the application of statutes. . . . It is not a proper remedy for what we
may call casual questions—questions with which the arbitrators have no particular experience and which are better left to the determination of skilled
judges with a background of legal experience and established systems of law.”).
As noted, Cohen is considered an architect of the FAA. See supra note 56.
253. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) (“[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”).
254. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
255. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”); see also, e.g.,
Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 335–36 (4th Cir. 2017) (refusing
to enforce arbitration agreement that required claims against payday lender to
be resolved using tribal law because agreement effectively waived federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to enforce arbitration
clause that waived party’s “statutorily-mandated right to recover reasonable attorney’s fees” under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act).
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Instead of reflecting the nature of arbitration or terms of the
parties’ agreement, the fact that federal statutory rights survive
the switch from litigation to arbitration reflects the operation of
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Under those
principles, a statute that addresses a specific problem such as
the prevalence of job discrimination takes precedence over a
cross-cutting statute that deals in general terms with the procedures used to resolve legal disputes.256 The last-in-time principle
leads to the same conclusion.257 If an agreement to arbitrate directs the arbitrator to discriminate against women, the FAA and
Title VII command irreconcilably conflicting results.258 Because
Title VII postdates the FAA, Title VII controls.259
The fact that laws governing primary conduct qualify the
FAA explains why the debate between the Justices in Epic Systems focused on the meaning of the right to engage in concerted
activity under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA rather than
that right’s relationship to the FAA.260 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
for the Court reasoned that because the right to engage in concerted activities “appears at the end of a detailed list of activities” dealing with union organizing and collective bargaining in
Section 7 of the NLRA, that right stops at the courthouse door.261
Like the activities that precede it, the right to engage in concerted activities “serve[s] to protect things employees ‘just do’ for

256. See supra note 218.
257. See supra text accompanying note 216.
258. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
259. The fact that federal conduct-regulating statutes qualify the FAA does
not explain why those statutes apply in international arbitrations that are not
governed by the FAA, or why state substantive rights survive the switch from
litigation to arbitration. See supra text accompanying note 81; supra note 164
and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 246–48. With respect to
the former question, Mitsubishi suggested, somewhat implausibly, that ex post
review at the award-confirmation stage would ensure that international arbitrators applied federal regulatory statutes in transnational disputes. See
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward,
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws has been addressed.”). Perhaps the best explanation for the
applicability of state substantive rights in arbitration is that, under traditional
federalism principles, a clearer congressional statement than those that appear
in the FAA would be necessary for the FAA to override state substantive rights.
See generally Morris v. Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that
principles of federalism “militate against” the Court’s jurisdiction over contract
actions because they “are traditionally reserved for states to resolve”).
260. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
261. Id. at 1625.
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themselves in the course of exercising their right to free association in the workplace, rather than ‘the highly regulated, courtroom-bound ‘activities’ of class and joint litigation.’”262 Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg countered that a coercive “waiver” of the
right to engage in forms of aggregate dispute resolution that are
permitted by generally applicable law is the precise type of exploitative agreement that Norris-LaGuardia and the NLRA aim
to prevent.263 Those acts reflect Congress’s concern that “the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor.”264
Following seventy-five years of judicial and administrative precedent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the NLRA prevents employers from interfering with employees’ right to “pursue joint,
collective, and class suits related to the terms and conditions of
their employment” through individual employment agreements
that purport to deny employees the power to function as a collective.265
On the merits, Justice Ginsburg has the better of the debate
over the meaning of the right to engage in concerted activities.266
But for present purposes, the important point involves that
right’s relationship to the FAA’s rules of dispute resolution procedure. If the NLRA in fact guaranteed a right to engage in collective dispute resolution to the extent permitted by generally
applicable procedural rules, as Justice Ginsburg contended, that

262. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Alternative Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 414–15
(6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
263. Id. at 1635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 1635 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).
265. Id. at 1637.
266. As Justice Ginsburg observed, an individual employment agreement
that waives the right to engage in collective dispute resolution via an undertaking to arbitrate disputes on an individual basis is strikingly similar to the yellow-dog contracts that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA § 7 were enacted
to address. Id. See generally Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal
Reform, 1917–1932, 30 LAB. HIST. 251, 270–74 (1989). Those statutes refer to
“concerted activity” in general terms rather than specifically addressing dispute
resolution procedure because Congress could not have anticipated all the ways
that employers might interfere with employees’ concerted activity. Id. Indeed,
it was not until the early 2000s that the legal foundations for barring collective
action via arbitration were established. See David L. Noll, With Arbitration
Case, SCOTUS Can Protect Both Federal Law, Workers’ Rights, HILL (Oct. 7,
2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/354386-with-arbitration-case-scotus
-can-protect-both-federal-law-workers-rights (so arguing).
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right would take precedence over the FAA, as even Justice Gorsuch concedes.267 It is only because the NLRA confers no such
right that the Epic Systems Court concluded employees’ obligation to arbitrate is controlled by the FAA alone.268
Of course, an agency that seeks to regulate the use of arbitration on the ground that it violates a statutory right must have
authority to enforce the right that the agency regulation vindicates.269 If, say, the NLRB asserted authority to regulate uses of
arbitration that violate the antitrust laws, its action would be
invalid because the NLRB is not charged with enforcing the antitrust laws.270 And agency arbitration regulation must comply
with generally applicable administrative law requirements such
as being supported by substantial evidence and reflecting a reasoned exercise of the agency’s delegated authority.271 If these requirements are satisfied, agency regulation based on the
agency’s conclusion that arbitration violates a substantive right
it enforces is a valid exercise of the agency’s authority under a
substantive regulatory statute.
2. Litigation-Structuring Statutes
The same principles that explain why conduct-regulating
rules apply in arbitration explain why statutes governing the
dispute-resolution process—such as those governing the burden

267. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (“Congress has instructed that arbitration
agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress is
of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it did
so in the NLRA—much less that it manifested a clear intention to displace the
Arbitration Act.”).
268. Id.
269. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (directing reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”).
270. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52
(2002) (NLRB may not order relief for actions made illegal by statutes it does
not administer). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (providing that the
Board is “empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice . . . affecting commerce”).
271. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (directing reviewing courts to set aside agency
action “unsupported by substantial evidence”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (establishing the principle that, when
reviewing agency action, the court must consider “whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477
(1951) (defining substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”).
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of proof,272 remedies,273 and attorneys’ fee-shifting274—do so as
well. Compared to conduct-regulating laws, it is more difficult to
explain these statutes’ applicability in arbitration on the ground
that they create substantive rights that apply in any forum
where a litigant seeks to vindicate her legal rights.275 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated—and lower courts have expressly held—that they apply in arbitration.276
The reason is that these statutes are more specific than the
FAA’s cross-cutting command that agreements to arbitrate are
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable. For instance, the Civil Rights
Attorneys’ Fees Act provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding
to enforce [specified civil rights laws], the court, in its discretion,
272. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”).
273. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (providing that a prevailing plaintiff
in an action to enforce the antitrust laws “shall recover threefold the damages
by it sustained, and the cost of suit”).
274. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce
[specified civil rights laws] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held
liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in
excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”).
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977). But see, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indust., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 277–80 (1989) (concluding that a state-law cap on damages is
“substantive” for purposes of the Erie doctrine and the Rules of Decision Act);
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (same; state-law statute of limitations).
276. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013)
(“In enacting such measures [as the Sherman Act’s treble damages provision],
Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful
trade practice.”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding that an arbitration agreement may not waive the right to treble damages and attorney’s fees under federal antitrust laws); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that where arbitration agreement
modifies parties’ responsibility to pay for attorney’s fees, “final responsibility for
attorney’s fees should be governed by the appropriate statute”); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (“The principle
that an arbitration agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies such
as punitive damages and attorney fees appears to be undisputed.”). But cf. Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating in dictum that “no general doctrine of federal law prevents people from waiving statutory rights (whether substantive or procedural) in exchange for other
things they value more, such as lower prices or reduced disputation”).
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may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”277 Similarly, the
Sherman Act provides that a prevailing plaintiff “shall recover
threefold the damages by it sustained, and the cost of suit.”278
While the statutes’ reference to the “court” might be read as a
signal that they do not apply in arbitration, their obvious intent
is to establish statutory remedies that apply in any action seeking to impose civil liability.279
This contrasts with procedural laws that do not apply in arbitration, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules
provide that they “govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts,”280 and they are
promulgated under a statute which gives the U.S. Supreme
Court “the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.”281 Explicitly limited to the
district courts, the rules do not establish procedures that apply
in any proceeding where a litigant seeks to impose civil liability.
3. Statutes that Subject Regulated Parties’ Contracting to
Agency Oversight
A third category of statutes that impliedly qualify the FAA
are those that authorize an agency or department to police regulated parties’ contracting. For example, amendments to the
Higher Education Act of 1965 authorize the Education Department to promulgate language that schools participating in the
federal direct loan program must incorporate into their student
agreements “to protect the interests of the United States and to
promote the purposes of [the direct loan program].”282 Prior to
the change of administrations, the DOE invoked this authority
to prohibit schools from mandating arbitration of predatory lending claims and using other contract provisions that had contributed to the collapse of several for-profit colleges.283 Similarly,
277. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
278. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
279. Cf. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 100–01 (2012) (reasoning that statutory disclosure provisions referring to an “action,” “class action,” and “court” reflected Congress’s intent that regulated parties be subject
to civil liability for statutory violations).
280. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
281. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
282. 20 U.S.C. § 1087d(a)(6) (2012).
283. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1,
2016) (final rule). The rule responded to Corinthian Colleges’ successful use of
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1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act give the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) authority to oversee rules of
securities self-regulatory organizations.284 Acting under this authority, the SEC has long regulated mandatory arbitration in the
securities industry.285
Like statutes that create substantive rights or address the
structure of dispute resolution, these statutes were enacted to
address specific problems. For instance, the Higher Education
Amendments seek to protect the public fisc and to ensure that
money spent via direct loans is only used for bona fide educational expenses.286 And the statutes generally post-date the
FAA. Thus, they qualify the FAA for the same reasons that statutes which create substantive statutory rights or statutory procedures do so.287 They are more specific than the FAA because
they address the problem that is more particularized than common law courts’ general hostility to arbitration. And to the extent that they irreconcilably conflict with the FAA, they take
precedence because they were enacted later in time.

arbitration clauses to obtain the dismissal of proposed class actions alleging
that it had engaged in predatory lending. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Corinthian
Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013); Montgomery v. Corinthian Coll., No.
11–C–365, 2011 WL 1118942, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2011). The Department
concluded that Corinthian’s arbitration requirements, with other contractual
liability protections, effectively immunized it from liability for predatory lending. 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926.
284. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)(2)(C)) (2012) (“The Commission shall approve a proposed rule change
of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such proposed rule change is
consistent with the requirements of this chapter and the rules and regulations
issued under this chapter that are applicable to such organization.”).
285. Rule 12,200 of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which took
effect following SEC approval, generally requires broker-dealers and their customers to arbitrate all disputes, subject to a carve-out for securities class actions
that are filed in court. FINRA CODE, RULE 12,200 (2008), http://finra
.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607&
record_id=609 (requiring arbitration of all disputes); FINRA CODE, RULE 12,204
(2008) http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&
element_Id=4906&record_id=5174&filtered_tag= (class action carve-out);
Gross, supra note 92, at 512 (“Since virtually all broker-dealers are members of
FINRA, ‘no broker-dealer can escape the self-regulatory system.’” (quoting NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
§ 4.01[C] (4th ed. 2007))).
286. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,933 (observing that the 2016 Borrower Defense Rule sought to further DOE’s statutory
mandate to “protect student loan borrowers while also protecting the Federal
and taxpayer interests”).
287. See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
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Opponents of agency arbitration regulation contend that
statutes which subject regulated parties’ contracting to agency
oversight do not allow an agency to regulate arbitration, because
the statutes do not specifically mention arbitration and the decision to regulate arbitration conflicts with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.288 But these arguments ignore the logic
of statutory provisions that grant agencies authority to police
regulated parties’ contracting. The point of these provisions is to
circumscribe parties’ freedom of contract because Congress
judged that their actions give rise to a problem that warrants
regulation.289 On the basis of that congressional judgment, the
statutes prototypically give an agency general authority over
regulated parties’ contracting. That power not only includes authority to restrict regulated parties’ choices regarding dispute
resolution, but also choices concerning price, conditions of performance, remedies, warranties, and other matters. It makes no
sense to insist that Congress spell out agencies’ authority to restrict the use of arbitration in so many terms, because this would
defeat Congress’s judgment that regulated parties’ contracting
should be subject to a second look to ensure that it does not create the harms Congress sought to prevent.
The test of the validity of arbitration regulation promulgated under a statute that authorizes an agency to police regulated parties’ contracting, then, is simply whether the agency adhered to the terms of the substantive statute it acted under and
followed generally applicable administrative-law requirements.
For instance, the DOE has authority under the Higher Educa-

288. Complaint at ¶¶ 100–12, California Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Sch.
v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-00999, 2018 WL 5017749 (D.D.C. May 24, 2017) (No. 17999). On the “freedom of contract” protected by the FAA, see Kindred Nursing
Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (“By its terms . . . the Act
cares not only about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration agreements, but also
about their initial ‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into them.”);
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
476 (1989) (“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set
of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”).
289. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(d)(a)(2) (2012) (providing that a participation
agreement between DOE and a college seeking to enroll in the direct loan program shall “provide assurances that the institution will comply with requirements established by the Secretary relating to student loan information with
respect to loans made under this part”). See generally 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 86–90 (1971) (noting that regulation is often a “negative process” wherein agencies “react” to the
initiatives of companies and private parties).
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tion Act to prescribe contractual provisions that it deems necessary to promote the purposes of the direct loan program and protect the interests of the United States.290 The 2016 Borrower Defense Rule unquestionably satisfies that standard.291 Following
the collapse of Corinthian Colleges, DOE studied the conditions
that contributed to Corinthian’s collapse and concluded that contractual restrictions on private civil litigation allowed the school
to engage in predatory lending for longer than otherwise would
have been possible.292 The Borrower Defense rule operates
within the space that the Higher Education Amendments carve
out from the FAA’s default procedural regime.
4. Statutes that Delegate Authority to an Agency to
Promulgate Subsidiary Administrative Policy
The final category of statutes that impliedly qualify the FAA
are those that charge an agency with implementing subsidiary
administrative policy under a regulatory statute.293 For example, the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 directs CMS to promulgate regulations governing nursing homes that receive money
from Medicare and Medicaid, and “to assure that requirements
which govern the provision of care in skilled nursing facilities
. . . are adequate to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights
of residents.”294 Other statutes delegate policymaking authority
to an agency by authorizing the agency to grant exemptions or
waivers from generally applicable regulatory requirements. For

290. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
292. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926, 75,933
(Nov. 1, 2016) (“Since the collapse of Corinthian, the Department has received
a flood of borrower defense claims stemming from the school’s misconduct. In
order to streamline and strengthen this process, we believe it is critical that the
Department proceed now in accordance with its statutory authority, as delegated by Congress, to finalize regulations that protect student loan borrowers
while also protecting the Federal and taxpayer interests.”).
293. This term originates in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944)
(“It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn
from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call
for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.”).
294. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(f ) (1), 1396r(f ) (1) (2012). The Act additionally provides that nursing homes must “protect and promote” eleven enumerated rights,
including rights “established by the [HHS] Secretary.” Id. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)
(xi), 1396r (c)(1)(A)(xi).
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instance, ERISA authorizes the Labor Department to grant individual or classwide exemptions from the fiduciary obligations
that the statute imposes on investment advisors.295
By now, it should be obvious why statutes that authorize an
agency to promulgate subsidiary administrative policy qualify
the FAA. Those statutes reflect Congress’s judgment that a problem warrants regulation through federal legislation.296 Rather
than set regulatory standards directly—a task that may be impossible or politically unattractive for lawmakers—Congress
delegates.297 When the agency reasonably concludes that the use
of arbitration should be limited or prohibited because arbitration
negatively impacts the agency’s statutory mandate, it acts under
a statute that impliedly modifies the FAA.298
That a statute authorizes an agency to prescribe subsidiary
administrative policy by waiving statutory requirements does
not change the conclusion that the statute impliedly modifies the
FAA. Like an affirmative grant of regulatory authority, a grant
of waiver authority reflects Congress’s judgment that a problem
in a particular area warrants regulation. Waiver authority differs from a grant of affirmative regulatory authority only in the
baseline that the agency operates against. Instead of (or in addition to) authorizing the agency to establish affirmative standards, the statute authorizes the agency to establish conditions in
which those requirements are waived.299
295. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (2012).
296. See Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Account of the Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for LongTerm Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7
ELDER L.J. 267, 268 (1999) (describing the problems that Congress sought to
address in the Act).
297. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424 (“The Constitution . . . does not require that
Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action
or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be
prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and
circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.”). On the
considerations that inform Congress’s choice to delegate or directly establish
regulatory standards by law, see EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 224, at 1–
10.
298. See Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 209 (N.D.
Tex. 2017) (concluding that arbitration restrictions in the DOL fiduciary rule
“fit[ ] within the DOL’s authority to grant ‘conditional or unconditional’ exemptions [under ERISA], and do not violate the FAA”).
299. On the policy logic of statutes that grant agencies waiver authority, see
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265 (2013); Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (2015).
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Perhaps the most common objection to the conclusion that
statutes such as the Nursing Home Reform Act qualify the FAA
is that those statutes are no more or less specific than the
FAA.300 Regulating arbitration under a substantive regulatory
statute is thus said to involve a paradox of specificity. The substantive statute is more specific than the FAA with respect to
uses of arbitration that impact its objectives (e.g., ensuring the
health and safety of nursing home residents). But the FAA is
more specific than the substantive statute with respect to dispute resolution procedure.
When reconciling overlapping statutes, however, courts do
not look exclusively to the language used in conflicting statutes
but also to the breadth or specificity of the problem that motivated Congress to legislate.301 A leading case illustrating this
principle is Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.302 At issue was the
relationship between Section 94 of the National Bank Act, which
provides that “a national bank may be sued only in the district
in which it is established,”303 and Section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that an action to enforce
the Act “may be brought in any . . . district [where the violation
occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is
an inhabitant or transacts business.”304 In securities fraud suits
against national banks, the two statutes gave rise to a paradox
of specificity similar to the one in disputes over agency arbitration regulation. The Bank Act is more specific about the venue
300. See Deacon, supra note 31, at 1039 (“The FAA . . . is likely to be the
earlier statute but also more general than subject-area-specific statutes that
might be read to limit it. . . . That the specific controls the general does not end
the matter, however. After all, one might object that the FAA is actually the
more specific statute in that it mentions arbitration whereas the statute being
invoked by the agency (by hypothesis) does not.”); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (“[T]he question before us is whether courts
must enforce particular arbitration agreements according to their terms. And
it’s the Arbitration Act that speaks directly to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, while the NLRA doesn’t mention arbitration at all. So if forced to
choose between the two, we might well say the Arbitration Act offers the more
on-point instruction.” (dictum)).
301. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33
(2000) (“In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. . . . [T]he meaning of one statute may be
affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently
and more specifically to the topic at hand.” (citing United States v. Estate of
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–31 (1998))).
302. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
303. Id.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
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for suits against banks, while the Exchange Act is more specific
about the venue for securities-fraud claims.305 Neither statute
addresses its effect on the other.
Confronted with this paradox, the Supreme Court held that
the Bank Act’s venue provision controlled. The Court observed
that—
When Congress enacted the narrow venue provisions of the National
Bank Act, it was focusing on the particularized problems of national
banks that might be sued in the state or federal courts. When, 70 years
later, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, its focus was on
the objective of promoting fair dealing in the securities markets, and it
enacted a general venue provision applicable to the broad universe of
potential defendants subject to the prohibitions of that Act.306

Because the problem Congress addressed in the National Bank
Act was more “particularized” than the one it addressed in the
Securities Act, the Bank Act controlled.
Analyzed this way, the paradox presented by agency arbitration regulation under a provision that charges an agency with
promulgating subsidiary administrative policy evaporates. The
FAA and the pertinent substantive statute may be equally specific at a linguistic level. But the substantive statute almost always deals with a “particularized problem[]” that is more specific than the problem that motivated the FAA.307 For instance,
Congress adopted the Nursing Home Reform Act “amidst stories
of unnecessary death and suffering in nursing homes” to “reform
the nursing home industry, improve the quality of nursing home
care, and protect the residents of long-term care facilities.”308
That objective is more particularized than the FAA’s general objective of overriding the judicial hostility to arbitration reflected
in the common law non-enforceability and revocability doctrines.309
Of course, an arbitration regulation promulgated under a
statutory provision that directs the agency to promulgate subsidiary administrative policy can be challenged on the ground
that arbitration does not actually have effects that implicate the
agency’s statutory mandate. Thus in American Health Care
Ass’n v. Burwell, a Mississippi district court concluded that CMS
had not compiled an adequate administrative record to support
its view that mandatory arbitration threatened nursing home
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 152.
Id. at 153–54 (emphasis added).
Id. at 154.
Grassley, supra note 296, at 268.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
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residents’ health and safety.310 Regulation under a statute that
charges an agency with elaborating subsidiary administrative
policy can also be challenged on the ground that the agency did
not comply with requirements such as considering material, nonfrivolous comments and giving a reasoned analysis of its regulatory approach.311
But again, this is the stuff of ordinary administrative law.
Agency arbitration regulation under a statute that charges the
agency with implementing subsidiary administrative policy may
or may not satisfy standard administrative-law requirements.
Because the statute the agency acts under impliedly qualifies
the FAA, the regulation does not fail for lack of statutory authority.
***
In sum, ordinary principles of statutory interpretation show
that the FAA’s background rules of statutory interpretation are
qualified by a range of federal statutes. Of course, there remains
the possibility of genuine conflicts between the FAA and other
laws, when principles of statutory interpretation do not answer
whether the FAA or the other law prevails.312 But in many scenarios relevant to agency arbitration, another statute expressly
or impliedly qualifies the FAA’s defaults. In addition to laws that
expressly address arbitration, the FAA is qualified by laws governing primary conduct, laws that establish specific procedures
and remedies for statutory claims, laws that charge an administrative agency with policing regulated parties’ contracting, and
laws that direct an administrative agency to promulgate subsidiary statutory policy. Between them, these statutes provide authority for a substantial swath of agency arbitration regulation.

310. 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 939 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (“[T]his court believes that
CMS would be required to actually prove that this negative impact is occurring,
with proof considerably more reliable than comments received from the public.”). The finding that CMS had failed to prove that arbitration harmed nursing
home residents was striking in light of the district court’s separate conclusions
that arbitration serves as a tool for “pure delay” in nursing home litigation, and
that the Long-Term Care Rule was “based upon sound public policy.” Id. at 928,
946.
311. See Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 336, 345 (D.C. Cir.
2017); Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
312. See Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 884 F.3d 382, 391 (2d Cir. 2018)
(concluding that a discharge injunction entered under § 524 of the Bankruptcy
Code barred enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration clause that related to core
bankruptcy proceedings, because enforcing the clause conflicted with bankruptcy’s fresh start policy).
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IV. LAWS THAT DO NOT QUALIFY THE FAA: CHEVRON
AND AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION
As the preceding Parts of this Article demonstrate, the FAA
establishes default rules of dispute resolution procedure that apply unless it is modified by another law. Those defaults are modified by a range of statutes that expressly or impliedly modify
the FAA and provide authority for many of the agency arbitration regulations that have been issued over the past decade.
There is, however, an important category of statutes that do not
qualify the FAA. These are the type of statutes addressed by the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.313
This Part completes this Article’s theory of the FAA’s relationship to other federal laws by explaining why what one might
call “Chevron statutes” do not modify the FAA. Sections A and B
review Chevron and explain why its holding that an agency may
speak with the force of law depends on the circumstances the
Supreme Court confronted in Chevron, in which an agency acts
under a single statute that it is charged with administering. Section C then explains why a Chevron-type statute, standing alone,
does not qualify the background rules established by the FAA,
and thus does not provide authority for an agency charged with
administering the statute to regulate arbitration in ways that
conflict with the FAA.
A. THE CHEVRON DECISION
The backdrop to Chevron is familiar but worth repeating to
clarify exactly what the Court there decided. In the decades following World War II, Congress enacted a large number of statutes that to a significant extent define the modern federal regulatory state.314 The statutes prototypically created an
administrative agency and charged it with implementing policy
under a statute, or charged an existing agency or department
with doing so.315 But lawmakers often neglected to specify which
313. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
314. For histories of Congress’s activity in the post-War era, see generally
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Part IV (3d
ed. 2005); JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (2014); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272–94 (1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2078–82 (1990).
315. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136, 146 (carrying forward the NLRA provision providing that
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institution—the courts or the implementing agency (or agencies)
charged with administering a statute—was authorized to interpret statutory gaps and ambiguities.316 Both courts and administrative agencies claimed the authority to interpret indeterminate statutory provisions—courts because “say[ing] what the
law is” is an archetypal judicial function, and agencies, because
administering a statute requires the agency to interpret it and
many agency interpretations will never be reviewed in court.317
Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court’s doctrine on the status of
agency statutory interpretation was inconsistent and contradictory.318
At issue in Chevron were 1977 amendments to the Clean Air
Act that directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
administer a new licensing program for states that had failed to
bring air pollution within limits required by the 1970 Clean Air
Act.319 The amended Clean Air Act directed EPA to perform a
long list of tasks and authorized the EPA administrator “to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions” under the statute.320 But the statute did not specify EPA’s
authority to interpret the statutory term “major stationary
the Board “is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce”)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352,
§ 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012)) (“Each Federal
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of Section 601 [prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted programs] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with
which the action is taken.”); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
§ 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)) (“The Administrator
shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with
the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is likely to cause or
to contribute to, air pollution which endangers the public health or welfare.”).
316. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1
155–57 (5th ed. 2010).
317. See Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983) (arguing “[i]t is in light of agency competence to
make law that the ‘duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’ must
be evaluated”).
318. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 316, at 155.
319. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 85).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1).
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source[].”321 That mattered because if every piece of pollutionproducing equipment (e.g., each smokestack) were considered a
“source,” EPA could not authorize states to treat power plants
and factories as a single source of pollution—an idea known as
the “bubble concept.”322 Regulatory reformers favored the bubble
concept because it encouraged firms to find cost-effective ways of
reducing pollution; environmentalists opposed the bubble concept because it allowed firms to put off adopting state-of-the-art
pollution control technology.323
Chevron famously held that when Congress enacts a statute
such as the 1977 Clean Air Amendments, it impliedly delegates
authority to the implementing agency to interpret the statute
provided that the agency interpretation is reasonable.324 Justice
John Paul Stevens’s opinion for the Court began by noting that
Congress might “explicitly [leave] a gap for the agency to fill,”
which evidenced “an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”325 Here, the agency’s “legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”326 Congress, however, might also
delegate authority to the agency via an “implicit rather than explicit” delegation by enacting indeterminate language or leaving
a “gap” in a statute that it “charged [an agency] with responsibility for administering.”327 Here, the agency’s “reasonable” interpretation is controlling.328
The theoretical rationale for this holding is the subject of
considerable debate.329 To briefly summarize, the “intentionalist” reading of Chevron posits that most questions about how an
321. Id. § 129(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5)).
322. See Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841
(1984).
323. See Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and Administrative Discretion, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 171, 179–81 (Richard
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
324. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
325. Id. at 843–44.
326. Id. at 844. This is the standard of review prescribed by § 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
327. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
328. Id. at 866.
329. E.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002); Antonin Scalia,
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agency-administered statute is “interpreted” are actually questions of subsidiary statutory policy.330 As between the courts and
an agency charged with administering a statute, the agency is
better positioned to make policy under the statute because of its
expertise and accountability to democratic politics via the president.331 Congress knows or should be presumed to know that
agencies are better policymakers than courts. Courts therefore
read indeterminate statutory provisions as delegating interpretive authority to the agency.
By contrast, the “structural” reading of Chevron posits that
a statutory ambiguity or gap creates space for the agency to exercise its background authority to make regulatory policy
through rulemaking or agency adjudication.332 The agency’s interpretation is controlling because Congress generally authorized the agency to make policy under the statute, and the agency
regulation works in the interstices of the specific provisions Congress enacted.
Whatever its theoretical rationale, the conclusion that indeterminate statutory language impliedly delegates regulatory authority to the agency charged with implementing a statute
yielded Chevron’s familiar two-step process for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation. “First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”333 If Congress has not addressed that issue, “the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”334

Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
273 (2011); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580 (2006); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 131; see also Evan
J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2008) (“Chevron
does not rest exclusively upon any of these competing rationales. Instead, Chevron forges a pragmatic consensus between several leading theories, none of
which can be properly considered redundant.”).
330. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 329.
331. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 329, at 370; Scalia, supra note 329, at 517;
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 131, at 925–27.
332. See, e.g., ESTREICHER & NOLL, supra note 147, at 590–91; Strauss, supra note 329, at 1145.
333. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
334. Id. at 843.
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B. CHEVRON’S LIMITS
Although Chevron clarified that Congress may delegate interpretive authority to an agency by enacting indeterminate language, many statutes fall outside of its scope.335 In United States
v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that a statute only
delegates interpretive authority to an agency if “the agency’s
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances
[reveal] that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”336 Mead focused on
the procedures that Congress authorized an agency to use in
promulgating administrative policy. While declining to lay down
a bright-line rule, the Court intimated that a statute must authorize the agency to engage in rulemaking or adjudication to
impliedly delegate interpretive authority to the agency.337
Another “statutory circumstance” that affects the agency’s
authority to speak with the force of law is the place of the agencyadministered statute in broader body of federal law. As Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman observe in a leading
article on “Chevron’s domain,” Chevron addresses scenarios in
which “a single agency is responsible for developing and enforcing policy under a statute.”338 It is in this context, Chevron holds,
that indeterminate statutory language delegates interpretive
authority to the administering agency.
On either the intentionalist or structural reading of Chevron, the single-statute single-agency structure is crucial to Chevron’s applicability. Consider a statute that multiple agencies administer.339 On the intentionalist reading, all of the agencies
charged with administering the statute have an interpretive
edge over the courts. That Congress opted for agency administra335. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187 (2006).
336. 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
337. Id. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings
for which deference is claimed.”).
338. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 335, at 893.
339. See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883–84 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing phenomenon of “statutes that parcel out
authority to multiple agencies, which ‘may be the norm, rather than an exception’” (quoting Jacob Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208 (2006))).
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tion does not answer which of these agencies’ views should control. The structural reading of Chevron points to the same conclusion. While indeterminate language creates space in which an
agency can exercise its background authority to make regulatory
policy, multiple agencies have background lawmaking authority.
And the mere fact that Congress has left space for the exercise
of that background authority does not indicate which agency’s
view should control.340
Based on this reasoning, courts have not accorded controlling weight to an agency interpretation when more than one
agency administers a statute,341 and where an agency seeks deference for its interpretation of a government-wide statute that
is not administered by that agency alone.342 Under this line of
precedent, no agency speaks with the force of law when it interprets the FAA as opposed to a statute the agency administers.
This conclusion follows from the basic problem Chevron addresses: how interpretive authority is allocated between the
courts and a single agency that is “charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”343
C. CHEVRON-TYPE STATUTES AS AUTHORITY FOR AGENCY
ARBITRATION REGULATION
Although the statutes described in sections A and B provide
authority for much agency arbitration regulation, executive
branch actors have also relied on Chevron-type statutes as authority to regulate arbitration in ways that conflict with the
FAA. For example, President Obama’s Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order344 directed federal contracting officers to
340. See id. at 1884 (“When presented with an agency’s interpretation of
such a statute, a court cannot simply ask whether the statute is one that the
agency administers.”).
341. See, e.g., Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d 1328, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855, 863
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Rapaport v. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 215–17 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir.
1993). But see 1185 Ave. of Americas Assocs. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 22 F.3d
494, 497 (2d Cir. 1994) (affording less than “full deference” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered by multiple agencies).
342. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 66
(2d Cir. 2008).
343. Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984).
344. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 79 Fed. Reg. 150 (July 31, 2014), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,683, 79 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 2014), repealed Pub. L. No.
115-111, 131 Stat. 2273; see Federal Acquisition Circular 2005–90, 81 Fed. Reg.
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ensure that certain federal contractors did not require their employees to arbitrate claims for sexual harassment and assault,
as is generally allowed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.345 Challengers contended that the
order was precluded by the FAA.346 The Department of Justice
responded that the Fair Pay Order was a valid exercise of the
president’s authority under the Procurement Act of 1949, which
authorizes the president in general terms to prescribe policies
and directives to “provide the Federal Government with an economical and efficient system” for purchasing goods and services.347
The Procurement Act does not authorize the president to
regulate arbitration in so many words, nor does it authorize the
president to police regulated parties’ contracting or direct the
president to implement a specific statutory policy that arbitration negatively impacts. Instead, the Act addresses a problem
(the need for a federal procurement system) which is at least as
broad as the one addressed by the FAA (the hostility to arbitration reflected in the common law revocability and unenforceability doctrines). DOJ’s position was that the Procurement Act’s
Chevron-style delegation—its general direction to administer a
statutory program—authorized the president to displace the
FAA’s background rules of dispute resolution procedure.348
But there is a crucial difference between the statutory circumstances Chevron addresses and those implicated by an arbitration regulation such as the Fair Pay order. Whereas Chevron
addresses a single agency’s interpretation of a single statute it
administers, the Fair Pay order implicates two statutes—the

165 (Aug. 25, 2016) (specifying contractual language that contracting agencies
must use to comply with the Order).
345. 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (holding that FAA § 1’s “employment” exception applies only to employees “actually engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce”).
346. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016
WL 8188655, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
347. 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a) (2012) (“The President may prescribe policies
and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out this subtitle.”).
348. Defs.’ Opp. to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Associated Builders & Contractors v. Rung, No. 1:16-cv00425-MAC, 2016 WL 8292054 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (No.16-cv-00425) (“As
courts . . . have recognized, the Procurement Act authority is broad.” (citing
AFL-CIA v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Procurement Act gives
the president “direct and broad-ranging authority”))).
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Procurement Act and the FAA. And those two statutes give conflicting signals about the extent of the delegate’s authority over
arbitration. As in the typical Chevron context, the statute the
president administers supports his authority to regulate. But
the FAA tugs in the opposite direction.
This difference undermines the inference that Congress impliedly delegated authority to the president to speak with the
force of law concerning arbitration in the Procurement Act. On
the intentionalist reading of Chevron, the executive’s relative advantages as a policymaker vis-à-vis the courts do not support the
inference that Congress intended the White House to make subsidiary statutory policy that carries the force of law, because one
of the statutes that bears on the Fair Pay Order’s validity—the
FAA—does not invite any institution apart from the courts to
make subsidiary statutory policy. Nor do the statutes relevant
to the Fair Pay order show that the agency has authority to regulate arbitration. The Procurement Act certainly delegates regulatory authority to the president. But as it is no more specific
than the FAA, it does not create space in which the president
may make subsidiary policy. The FAA fills the field.
The conclusion that a Chevron-type statute such as the Procurement Act does not allow agencies to regulate arbitration is
at odds with much scholarly writing on the question.349 In arguing otherwise, scholars generally rely on the following syllogism:
(1) a substantive regulatory statute’s effect on the FAA is often
ambiguous; (2) Chevron teaches that an agency’s reasonable in-

349. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 31, at 1035 (arguing “that, as a general
matter, agencies should have authority to reasonably interpret their statutes in
order to regulate arbitration” under Chevron); Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 31, at 908 (arguing that Chevron deference is “warranted
for the [National Labor Relations] Board’s finding that the NLRA provides employees with a substantive statutory right to pursue legal claims collectively,
which would render the arbitration agreements waiving that right unenforceable under the FAA”); Fisk, supra note 31, at 181 (same); Lloyd, supra note 31,
at 25 (arguing that FTC regulations restricting the use of arbitration under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are entitled to Chevron deference and take precedence over the FAA). But cf. Rebecca Hanner White, Arbitration and the Administrative State, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1283 (2003) (arguing that arbitrators are bound by agency statutory interpretations that are binding under
Chevron, but not considering the extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration under substantive regulatory statutes); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 428, 431 (2012) (suggesting that while “several formidable
arguments against deference deserve mention . . . portions of the NLRB ruling
and FINRA Rules . . . remain eligible for Chevron deference”).
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terpretation of a statute it administers is authoritative; therefore (3) if the agency charged with implementing a statute reasonably concludes that the statute modifies the FAA, the statute
in fact modifies the FAA.
For instance, an important recent contribution to the debate
over agency arbitration regulation contends that “[w]hether
there is a contrary congressional command [qualifying the FAA]
. . . is a question, essentially, of the meaning of the non-FAA statute being invoked.”350 Because Chevron holds that “Congress intends the agency and not the courts to be the principal interpreters of [indeterminate] legislation,” an implementing agency’s
reasonable view of “whether that statute ‘evince[s] an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights
at issue’” is authoritative.351 “Congress has chosen the agency
and not the court as the body to resolve the ambiguity. And such
a delegation [includes], by its nature, the power to disrupt background legal rules within prescribed bounds.”352 On this view, an
agency-administered statute standing alone may or may not
qualify the FAA’s background rules of dispute resolution procedure. But once the statute’s meaning is established through a
procedurally-proper agency interpretation, the statute may
qualify the FAA.
This argument, however, depends on the agency’s interpretation qualifying for Chevron treatment. And for reasons just explained, the usual inference that indeterminate statutory language signals that Congress intended to delegate interpretive
authority to the implementing agency does not hold when an
agency invokes a Chevron-type statute to regulate arbitration. If
the agency’s interpretation does not qualify for Chevron treatment, there is no basis for holding that an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is controlling—and no basis for
saying that statute modifies the FAA.
It follows that the district court’s decision in Associated
Builders and Contractors of Southeast Texas enjoining the Fair
Pay and Safe Workplace Order’s arbitration rules for lack of statutory authority was correct.353 The court there held that those
rules were not based on a “congressional command that would
350. Deacon, supra note 31, at 1036.
351. Id. at 1036–37 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
352. Id. at 1039.
353. Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425,
2016 WL 8188655, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
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override the requirement that arbitration agreements be enforced in accordance with their terms.”354 Although the court’s
order contains language suggesting that the FAA may only be
modified by legislation that expressly addresses arbitration355—
a proposition that Part III(b) showed is incorrect—the conclusion
that the Procurement Act does not modify the FAA’s background
rules of dispute resolution procedure correctly understands the
relationship between the two statutes. The president’s policies
implementing the Procurement Act may well carry the force of
law on an ordinary Chevron analysis. But the Act’s sweeping delegation of authority to the president to run the federal procurement system does not qualify the FAA’s defaults.
CONCLUSION
Regulation of arbitration by federal administrative agencies
is a flashpoint in larger conflicts over the U.S. civil justice system. In an effort to address the costs of procedural and regulatory balkanization and blunt the impact of entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ litigation, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
arbitration under the FAA, eliminating constraints that limited
arbitration’s impacts on federal regulatory policy for most of the
twentieth century. As the use of arbitration increased, agencies
charged with administering substantive regulatory statutes invoked those statutes to regulate the use of arbitration within
their areas of authority. But agencies’ efforts to limit arbitration’s policy impacts have been plagued by persistent questions
about agencies’ statutory authority. Those questions took on new
importance following the 2016 election, as opponents of agency
arbitration regulation—some now operating from within the
agencies they previously attacked—invoked agencies’ supposed
lack of authority to regulate arbitration as a justification for rolling back Obama-era arbitration regulations.
This Article offers a general theory of the legal question at
the heart of disputes over agency arbitration regulation: how the
FAA relates to other federal laws. The Article shows that the
FAA functions as a statutory floor whose rules of dispute resolution procedure apply unless and until it is qualified by another
law. Statutes that expressly qualify the FAA include those that
specifically address the validity, revocability, and enforceability
of arbitration agreements and those that delegate authority to
354. Id. at *14.
355. See id. (“Congress may choose to modify one statute with another
and . . . it knows how to limit arbitration policies when it so desires.”).
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regulate arbitration to an administrative agency. Statutes that
impliedly qualify the FAA include those that establish statutory
rights and remedies, as the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence
recognizes. But they also include statutes that authorize an
agency to police regulated parties’ contracting, and laws that
charge an agency with implementing subsidiary administrative
policy. Conspicuously absent from the list of statutes that qualify
the FAA are Chevron-type statutes that charge an agency with
administering a statutory scheme without directing the agency
to implement a specific statutory policy. Although Chevron holds
that such a statute delegates regulatory authority to the implementing agency, the statutory circumstances that this holding is
based on are missing in the context of agency arbitration regulation.
The Article’s theory has immediate implications for judicial
review of the Trump administration’s efforts to rollback Obamaera arbitration regulations, many of which are premised on the
incorrect conclusion that the regulating agency lacks authority
to regulate the use of arbitration under a substantive grant of
regulatory authority. But the Article’s theory is relevant beyond
the current deregulatory moment. The FAA is less exceptional
than supporters and critics of the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence both tend to assume. Understanding this point is
essential for evaluating conflicts such as Epic Systems. And it
sheds light on the extent of agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration when and if control of the executive branch returns to a
pro-regulatory administration.
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APPENDIX A
POST-2007 ARBITRATION STATUTES356
Title

Summary

Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–234
§ 11004, 122 Stat. 923 (2008)

Allows covered poultry farmers to
opt out of arbitration agreements
with poultry processors

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5
§ 1553, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)

Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate whistleblower claims under
Act

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 531(b)(1), 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Preempts state law restrictions on
insurers’ power to resolve disputes
pursuant to contractual arbitration

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 748, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate commodities industry whistleblower claims

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 921, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Authorizes Securities Exchange
Commission to regulate broker/dealers’ use of arbitration

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 922, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Prohibits agreements requiring arbitration of securities whistleblower
claims

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 1028, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Authorizes Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate consumer
financial companies’ use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements

356. This table aims to gather all federal statutes that address the validity,
enforceability, or revocability of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate that were
enacted between January 1, 2007, and May 1, 2018. The table excludes statutes
providing for arbitration under the auspices of a court or agency, statutes that
address arbitration of labor disputes, and those that provide for arbitration of
claims involving the United States under an international agreement. The table
was generated by searching ProQuest’s database of public laws for statutes that
mention the terms “arbitration” or “arbitrate” and reviewing the data manually
to exclude false positives.
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 1057(d), 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Prohibits pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate consumer finance industry
whistleblower claims

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 1414, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010)

Prohibits pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in mortgage loan contracts

Department of Defense and FullYear Continuing Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10 § 8102, 125
Stat. 38 (2011)

Prohibits covered Defense Department contractors from requiring employees to arbitrate claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and claims for sexual assault and
sexual harassment (Franken Amendment)

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-74 § 8101, 125 Stat.
786 (2012)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-6 § 8097, 127 Stat. 198 (2013)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 113-76 § 8096, 128 Stat.
5 (2014)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235 § 8101, 128 Stat. 2130
(2014)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
114-113 § 8097, 129 Stat. 2242
(2015)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-31 § 8096, 131 Stat.
135 (2017)

Franken Amendment

Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243
(2017)

Disapproves Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Arbitration Rule
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Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-126
§ 202, 132 Stat. 318 (2018)

Provides that the United States Center for Safe Sport may utilize arbitration to resolve allegations of sexual abuse within its jurisdiction but
preserves victims’ right to pursue
civil remedies through the courts for
personal injuries

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 8095 (2018)

Franken Amendment

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 7029 (g)
(2018)

Directs Secretary of Treasury to instruct the United States executive
director of each international financial institution to require that institution is following best practices for
protection of whistleblowers, including access to external arbitration

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 7058(b)
(2018)

Requires Secretary of State to ensure
that Global Fund to Fight Aids follows best practices for protection of
whistleblowers, including access to
external arbitration
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APPENDIX B
AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION SINCE 2007357
Agency &
Regulation

Date of last
agency action

Summary

Status

Commodities
Futures Trading
Commission,
Regulation 7.201

Aug. 6, 2009

Requires members of Chicago
Board of Trade
to arbitrate customer disputes.
No class action
carve-out

In effect

Department of
Defense, Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement;
Extension of Restrictions on the
Use of Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements

June 29, 2011

Implements
Franken
Amendment
prohibitions on
defense contractors’ use of mandatory arbitration

In effect

National Labor
Relations Board,
D.R. Horton/Murphy Oil rule

Oct. 28, 2014

Prohibits
individually
negotiated employment agreements that bar
employees from
joining together
to assert claims
in arbitration or
litigation

Invalidated by
Supreme Court
in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis

357. This table aims to gather all proposed or final agency actions regulating
the use of arbitration that were announced between January 1, 2007, and May
1, 2018. The table excludes agency regulations that address arbitration under
the auspices of a court or agency, regulations that address arbitration of labor
disputes, and regulations that provide for arbitration of claims involving the
United States under an international agreement. It was compiled by searching
the Federal Register for documents that contain the terms “arbitration” or “arbitrate” and reviewing the results by hand to exclude false positives.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, case-specific
challenges to arbitration agreements used as
part of a pattern
or practice of employment discrimination

Nov. 21, 2014

EEOC challenges mandatory arbitration
agreement that
agency contends
was used as part
of pattern and
practice of employment discrimination

Last complaint
filed Nov. 21,
2014

Executive Office
of the President,
Fair Pay and
Safe Workplaces
Executive Order

Aug. 23, 2016

Directs federal
contracting officers to ensure
that contractors
do not mandate
arbitration of
claims for sexual
assault and harassment

Repealed by
Congress via
Congressional
Review Act

Department of
Defense, Military
Lending Act Regulation

Aug. 26, 2016

Prohibits covered creditors
from mandating
that military
borrowers agree
to arbitration

In effect

Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Regulation Z Amendments

Nov. 22, 2016

Implements
Dodd-Frank Act
provision prohibiting arbitration clauses and
waivers of statutory causes of
action for loans
secured by a residential dwelling

In effect
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Federal Communications Commission, Broadband Privacy
Regulation

Dec. 2, 2016

Commits to initiating a rulemaking on use
of mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts
for broadband
and other communications services

Proposed arbitration rulemaking never initiated. Broadband
Privacy Regulation repealed by
Congress via
Congressional
Review Act

Commodities
Future Trading
Commission,
Whistleblower
Awards Process

May 30, 2017

Implements provision of DoddFrank Act that
prohibits arbitration of whistleblower claims
under section 23
of the Commodities Exchange
Act

In effect

Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services,
Long-Term Care
Rule

June 6, 2017

Prohibits nursing homes from
including mandatory arbitration clauses in
admission contracts

Preliminarily
enjoined.
Amended rule
proposed June 6,
2017

Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Arbitration Rule

July 19, 2017

Prohibits use of
arbitration
agreements to
block class actions filed in
public courts.
Requires submission of data
on arbitral filings and outcomes to Bureau

Repealed by
Congress via
Congressional
Review Act
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Department of
Education, Borrower Defense
Rule

Oct. 24, 2017

Prohibits
schools that participate in federal direct loan
program from
mandating arbitration of students’ claims or
making use of
arbitral class action waivers

In effect pursuant to judicial
vacatur of interim rule
proposing to
postpone 2016
rule’s effective
date

Department of
Labor, Fiduciary
Rule

Nov. 29, 2017

Requires retirement plan advisors to forego
use of arbitral
class action
waivers to use
compensation
practices otherwise prohibited
by ERISA

Effective date
stayed pending
agency reconsideration; vacated
by U.S. Court of
Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit
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APPENDIX C
HISTORICAL AGENCY ARBITRATION REGULATION358
Agency & Regulation
Securities Exchange
Commission, FINRA
Arbitration Rules

Federal Trade Commission, Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act Regulations

Summary
Carries forward New
York Stock Exchange
rules requiring arbitration of broker
-dealer disputes subject to class action
carve-out
Prohibits arbitration
of breach of warranty
claims under Magnuson-Moss Act

Current status
In effect

In effect. Courts
divided on validity

358. This table aims to gather all proposed or final agency actions regulating
the use of arbitration that were announced before January 1, 2007. It was compiled through a review of the secondary literature.

